Quoting as Pretending a Sign

ABSTRACT
The author gives a general theory of quotation. Considerations start with a sketch of a general theory of communication, and a vast part of it is a theory of sign. The presented approach is based on the observation that in a quotation you do not have a reproduction of a system of communication accompanying the quoted utterance and which include the speaker, his intention to communicate a given content to a given listener with the given sign, the listener and the context. Without all of this you do not have a sign, and hence a quote is not another token of the quoted sign but it is merely the shape of it. Quotations are clearly distinguished from other similar significant activities like imitations. Main known approaches to quotation are rejected: proper name, descriptive, demonstrative, disquotational and identity theories. The author argues against Tarski, Quine, Geach, Davidson, Cappelen and Lepore and others. Open quotations, concatenations, quotation marks, use and mention duality, onomatopoeias, that-clauses, translative and paraphrase quotations, substitution under quotation, quantification under quotation and mixed quotations are analyzed. Generally the author rejects the compositional and lingual paradigms in analysis of communication and underlines the significance of suggesting and guessing.

KEY WORDS
Quotation, quotation marks, communication, sign, meaning, pointing, language, that-clauses.

1. Preface
In the present article I offer my theory of quotation. You can see it as a new item of the tradition coming from Davidson’s ‘On Quotation’ (1979), through works of such authors like Clark and Gerrig (1990) and Recanati (2000, 2001, 2008), though I find their theories wrong or incomplete. On the other hand the fact is that I made my theory independently and the source of it was my deep intuitive convincement which I have nourished from the very beginning that a quote is an
act of pretending an utterance. From this point of view my work is a continuation of Wierzbicka’s research (1974). The whole paper is an attempt to put this intuition with words that are exact enough to embark successfully on discussion with alternative theories.

The need to formulate a theory of quotation forced me to prepare a quite detailed theory of communication that includes a theory of sign. It comprises a large part of the article. I do not only present my own view but also argue against the main classic theories of quotation. Every of them comes out from a natural intuition and I think that it is necessary to show in which points they are wrong from the point of view of a new theory, even if some of them are not asserted today. Hence I argue against: the proper name theory, considered by Tarski and Quine (par. 29), the descriptive theory, held by Geach (par. 42), Davidson’s demonstrative theory (par. 26), the disquotational theory, in versions of Richard (1986) and Ludwig and Ray (1998) (par. 23), and the identity theory, held by Washington (par. 24). Also you will find here the analysis of open quotations (par. 22, 31), concatenations (par. 15, 23, 35, 41, 42), quotation marks (par. 23, 25), use and mention duality (par. 23), onomatopoeias (par. 30), that-clauses (par. 48-53), translatave and paraphrase quotations (par. 38), substitution under quotation (par. 44), quantification under quotation (par. 45-47) and mixed quotations (par. 52). On the other hand scare quotations (see Saka 2013, 937) are not discussed here (I think that they are usual quotations but they go on in the implicature layer), and also I restrict to the minimum the analysis of indirect quotes to which as I believe belong all the kinds of nonserious use of language and all our utterances concerning abstract objects like kinds or numbers as well (par. 48-53).

2. Various Forms of Communication
The aim of communicating is that the recipient understands you no matter what means of signification you use. You can use some customary communicational tools, which comprise languages (in my opinion natural languages are in fact systems of communicational customs), but acts of communication may be improvised (uncustomary) as well, they may apply various gestures, anything goes in fact here (see Davidson 1986). For example you can say:

1. ‘I want to eat a fish’.

But also you can say instead:

2. ‘I want to eat a…’
and make a fish shape with your hands in the air. Or instead at this moment you could point to a fish if one were located nearby. You could point to a picture of a fish as well etc. Similarly you could say merely:

3. ‘I want to…’

And replace the word ‘eat’ with some moves of your hands and mouth that would picture an action of eating, and then point to a fish. Actually in some contexts mere picture the eating and point to a fish could be enough, hence speaking the phrase ‘I want to’ would not be necessary. The recipient could guess it. It is important for my theory that when you communicate in general you use language patterns (customs), but other various improvised forms like showing and performing more or less accurate samples or effigies can be used as well.

3. The Concept of Sign

The utterance is a physical event thus when you apprise of it you have at your disposal all the ways of communicating of any kind of physical particulars (for the sake of brevity I use the term ‘particular’ instead of ‘object or event’). In order to consider properly apprising of kinds of particulars we need a theory of communication. The theory needs to be extraordinarily general and subtle so that we could see the communication in every of its aspects with all the necessary distinct details. In this way we will have the chance to find the proper place for quotation in it. This is not my aim to present the whole such a theory here but I hope that it will be enough just to draw a preliminary sketch of it. I will come down to the details that are important form the point of view of the problem of quotation. Of course some parts of such a theory are obvious or well known. And let me also specify that the sketch omits entirely the emotional (motivational) aspect of language and is focused merely on communicating the propositional content.

First let me say a few words about the basic concept here which is the sign. It is a concept of a special kind. It names a part of a whole and the whole is a system or a structure (strictly speaking: a group of elements related one to another in a given way). In this respect it resembles such concepts like a leg or a cousin. It does not make any sense to speak of a leg which is not a part of a body (a leg is a part of a body ex definitione). Similarly one that has ever had no family may not be a cousin. The same goes on with signs. An object or an event may not be a sign if it is not a part of a whole. In the case of a sign the whole is the process of communication and it takes place in the communicational system which includes:

I. The sender (the speaker or writer etc.),
II. The recipient (the listener or reader etc.),
III. Interactions between them,
IV. The surroundings which interact with them or interacted in the past
(called the context, see par. 10).

The communicational process includes:

I. The sender’s intention to generate the given content in the given
recipient’s mind with a given sign,
II. The sign: the whole composed of:
   a. The sender’s significant behavior,
   b. The significant effects of it,
   c. Significant particulars indicated by them and
   d. Significant context.
III. The act of perceiving the sign by the recipient,
IV. Production of the content of the sign in the recipients mind by the
   process of understanding the sign.

The intention means that the sender simply wants that the given content
appeared in the recipients mind. The act of the sender’s will is necessary for the
concept of communication because accidental or mistaken messages are not acts
of communication. Say that you put apples on your keyboard and by a chance
the phrase ‘you are stupid’ was typed and sent as an e-mail to your friend. It
would not be a case of communication. It would be a case of mistaken use of an
established channel of communication. On the other hand the will must refer to a
recipient. You do not want to send a message to anybody in the Universe. You
want to apprise of something a given person. Thus when your message gets to
an unintended recipient it is not a case of communication again.

In the strict sense only an intentional communicational behavior which is
interpreted in the intended way in the intended recipient’s mind comprise a sign;
even a letter in a bottle has got an intended, though very broadly defined,
recipient. Remember that there is no sign without a meaning, and the meaning of
a sign is defined only in the whole given communicational system, i.e. who says
what to whom in what circumstances. Nevertheless by metonymy we often call
‘signs’ behaviors which are not a part of the whole communicational process:
words spoken unintentionally when being delirious, words spoken but not heard
by the intended listener, words heard but not understood, or not understood in
the intended way etc. If a bug walking in the sand would produce a line looking
like the sentence ‘Why are you watching?’ it would not be a sentence nor a sign.
It would look like a sign merely. Similarly a T-bar has the shape of the letter ‘T’
but it is not a letter, and rings of Saturn are not the letter ‘o’.
4. Metonymies Based on Sign
Making metonymies we simplify our language but on the other hand often we lose the correct meaning of words. Take the situation that there is a factory making legs to given customer’s orders, so the production is individualized. In the basic strict sense a leg is a part of human body attached to it in the given way so it can perform the given function. Nevertheless we tend to say that the factory produces legs and that they are legs related to given persons from the beginning. That is a metonymy merely because until they are attached to human bodies they are not legs at all (they are not parts of human bodies). If Jones’ leg were affixed to Smith’s body still we would tend to say that this is Jones’ leg. It is a useful simplifying metonymy though from the point of view of the strict sense it is an absurd (a part of a human body may not be a part of another human body if they are separated one from another).

My intention is to emphasize that a kind of behavior or a result of it is a sign only if it is a part of a communicational system where all the parts are related in the way that a communicational process goes on. If any point of this puzzle lacks there is not a sign, strictly the behavior or the result of it is not a sign. For example the unintended hearers do not complete a communicational system in the rigorous sense, even if they understand it correctly, because only the intended hearer belongs to the system as the recipient. Thus they are merely the observers (witnesses) of a sign which was not intended for them. If an eavesdropper hears the words ‘I love you’ that is obvious that they do not mean that the speaker loves him. Nevertheless he can understand them because he can imagine what they would mean if they were told to him (if he were the intended recipient). Hence a behavior which did not reach the intended recipient’s mind but was observed by a third person and understood by him as the sender intended it for the intended recipient still is not a sign in the strict sense, it is a behavior which was intended to be a sign but ineffective. Intuitively speaking I can say that an ineffective sign is not a sign because it has produced no intended content in the intended mind. Its actual meaning (what content was actually produced in the intended recipient’s mind) is none, and its dispositional meaning (what content it produces usually when it gets to the intended recipient’s senses in given circumstances) was not used. Therefore there is only an arrested attempt to producing content in the intended recipient’s mind. Overall we would not ever talk about signs in any other meaning if there were no sign in the basic sense I mean here, so this sense is the core of all the metonymies.

Notice that our sense of metonymy is not equally elastic in every case and that the idea of a factory producing cousins seems to be stupid from the beginning. Perhaps it is so because in the case of legs in the strict sense you can say that the factory produces objects that become legs when attached to the customers’ bodies, whereas you cannot say anything similar about cousins.
5. Parts of Sign
The sign is composed of everything that is used by the sender in order to produce the given content in the recipient’s mind. The significant effects include not only written signs but also such cases like use of a tape recorder to play an utterance or telling a third person to say a given phrase. Also particulars that you indicate in a way to inform your recipient what content you want to transmit to him are parts of the sign. In the above case with a fish the pointed fish is a part of the sign, and also the photo of a fish in the next version of the case is the part of the sign. When you keep an orange in your hand and you say:

4. ‘I like fruits like this’
the orange is a part of the sign. When you point to a table and say:

5. ‘This is black’
then the table is a part of the sign. In such cases like the last one the object you talk about and the sign that represents it is one and the same thing. The word ‘this’ plays merely the role of indicating the object and it does not substitute it, though it may seem that it does from grammatical point of view. Similarly a pointing gesture does not substitute any particular. And also when you say:

6. ‘This table is black’
the table is a part of the sign and the phrase ‘this table’ merely indicates it. The reason why it is to be like that is the idea that the sign is to contain everything that is necessary for the recipient to understand it. Thus the mere words ‘this table’ is not enough because the recipient still does not know which table is meant by them. For the relevant content is produced in the recipient’s mind he has to count the table itself too. In the extreme way this aspect is present in such cases as when you want your recipient to see that John is dancing with Mary and you say:

7. ‘Look at that!’.
In fact your words are entirely a mere act of pointing and the situation that you want your recipient to look at (and have created the relevant content in mind) is another part of the sign. On the other hand when you use proper or general names like ‘London’ or ‘orange’ then London or any orange are not parts of the sign because your recipient has already known what London and oranges are, hence he needs not to see them. Thus when you speak without indexicals your signs are composed of your words only.
On the other hand when you say:

8. ‘The door is wooden’

And your recipient guesses which door you mean upon that there is only one
door in the room then your phrase ‘the door’ is an act of nominal pointing but
the room itself is also necessary for guessing, and this is the significant context.
Every pointing goes on in an adequate context, and they are two inseparable
parts of it. For pointing be effective the context must be adequate, i.e. it is to be
chosen in such a way that there is only one thing your indication hits.

I hope that it is understandable now that there are basically two kinds of partial
signs:

I. Semantic and
II. Indicative ones.

The significant signs carry this aspect of meaning which is the matter to produce
the relevant content in the recipient’s mind whereas the indicative play the
supportive role and inform the recipient which particulars are to be used as
semantic partial signs. After the indicative partial signs have played their role
they become silent and the final content produced in the recipient mind does not
contain any remains of them—it is built merely upon the semantic partial signs.
It is so in ideal cases but usually the process of understanding (interpretation) is
not ended for a reason and this what the recipient obtains is an unfinished
content and then he still keeps the indicative partial signs as provisional parts of
the content. Say that you enter the room and shout to your friend present there:

9. ‘This man drives me crazy!’

The man you talk about is a semantic partial sign of your communication act and
until your recipient knows who he is your sign is not completed and hence your
friend cannot put the proper man into the content which is produced in his mind
so he has to keep your phrase ‘this man’ instead, and hence he is kept without
exact understanding what you really say. Sometimes it may take years until he
understands your words finally. (Cf. the use of the term ‘supportive’ in Clark
and Gerrig 1990, p. 768). (I use here the term meaning in the third sense—after
actual and dispositional senses of meaning (see par. 4)—and I call it operational
meaning. It refers to the way the partial sign contributes to the actual or
dispositional meaning of the sign. Thus the operational meaning may be of two
kinds: semantic or indicative.)
If it is still strange for you that a table may be a part of the sign consider this. When you draw a table on paper you can accept the drawing as a picture partial sign. Thus what about that you simply point to a picture of a table drawn by somebody else? It seems that there is no essential difference between drawing a table yourself and pointing to a ready-made picture of it. And then if pointed objects may be signs then why only pictures but not tables themselves? Thinking like that you finally obtain the idea that the sign is composed of everything that is necessary for the recipient to have the given content produced in his mind.

6. Content as Public Object

The all above does not mean that communication is closed for any external observation and analysis. First it is possible that even if you are not the intended recipient you are in a position similar to him and you can perceive the sign in the same way that he does or would do, e.g. you are in the same room and you can hear the utterance as well, or you can read the message sent to somebody else and have knowledge of all the mentioned particulars similarly as the intended recipient has. In such cases if the message does not contain the indexical ‘you’ or similar in principle you can understand the sign in the similar way that the intended recipient does. What is required, your communicative abilities must be similar to abilities possessed by him, thus you have to know the language as well as he does and possess guessing skills as good as he does. In this manner the content may be produced in your mind in the similar way as in his. In the case the sender uses the indexical ‘you’, you have to switch its meaning to the person of the intended recipient.

Second you can have an indirect knowledge of the sign, say fragmentary reports of other persons, recordings, photographs. In such a case when you already have possessed all the necessary details you can gather them and strive to imagine what content the intended recipient obtained by it. It is the case also when you do not know the language well enough or you are not as good in guessing. Patiently you can unravel the sign but it would not be a case of direct understanding.

It may seem strange why I insist that even the public analysis of a sign tends to discover mental content of it. You could say that instead of talking about something mental you can formulate the content of a sign with a that-clause, e.g.:

10. ‘The utterance ‘Socrates was a philosopher’ means that Socrates was a philosopher’.

Unfortunately that-clauses do not put the content in a way independent of minds but they just serve as a tool to produce the same mental content as the sign they
quote, for they are simply quotes, as I claim below (see par. 38, 48f.). Therefore there is no way out and the only you can do when you talk about a given content is to present an example of an utterance that causes it in a recipient’s mind in some given circumstances, thus any analysis of a sign always must aim to unveil the mental content it causes in the intended recipient’s mind.

7. Signs as Functional Names
More formally the concept of a sign is a function. Usually when we use a functional name (like ‘father’) we have to complement it with the name of the argument of the function. Thus we say:

11. ‘Peter is John’s father’
12. ‘Peter is the father of the child’
13. ‘Peter is a father of a girl’.

But we omit the argument when it is as general that it covers the whole range of its variability, because it would lead to a tautology. Thus we do not say:

14. ‘Peter is a father of a child’ or
15. ‘Peter is a father of a living being’

because such sentences are tautological. Instead we omit the complementation and say simply:

16. ‘Peter is a father’.

This sentence means in fact that there is a living being (a human) that Peter is the father of. Of course it is to say the same as that there is a whole (of two elements) that fulfills a specific (holistic) predicate (being a pair of a father and his child) and that Peter is the father. Thus in such cases functional concepts (predicates, names) are used as partial concepts (predicates, names), i.e. they are used to state that a particular is a part of a whole. Therefore the above sentences mean the same as:

17. ‘There is a pair of a father and his child, and Peter is the father, and John is the child’
18. ‘There is a pair of a father and his child, and Peter is the father, and the child (the earlier mentioned one) is the child’
19. ‘There is a pair of a father and his child, and Peter is the father, and the child is a girl’
20. ‘There is a pair of a father and his child, and Peter is the father’
Hence actually sentences with functional or partial predicates concern pairs or longer lists of elements, and some of them (at least one) are explicitly enumerated. I claim that exactly the same we have with the concept of a sign (or a leg). Hence when we say that

21. ‘The particular X is a sign’

it means in fact that there is a whole (a communicational system, see par. 3) that fulfills a specific predicate (that communicational process goes on in it, see par. 3), and that X is the sign in it. Therefore the above sentence is an abridgement of the tautological sentence like:

22. ‘The particular X is a sign in a communicational system’ or
23. ‘The particular X is a sign that its sender used to communicate a content to his recipient in given circumstances’.

Or finally:

24. ‘There is a list of elements which comprise a communicational system, and X is the sign in it.’

It is also possible that in a sentence more than one element of the list is enumerated and some other aspects of the relation between elements are presented. For example the sentence:

25. ‘John said ‘I love you’’

means in fact:

26. ‘There was a list of elements which comprised a communicational system and John was the sender, the kind of communicational activity was an utterance, and the shape ‘I love you’ was the sign.’

Similarly:

27. ‘The object Y is a leg’

means that there is a body that Y is a part of and that Y plays the role of a leg in it:

28. ‘There is a list of elements which comprise a body and Y is a leg in it.’
(The situation in the case of a sign is not as elegantly clear as in the case of a father, and even of a leg, because some parts of the communicational system are objects, as the sender and the recipient, and some other are events, as the communicational behavior or perceiving it, so this is not so easy to divide the whole clearly into a list of objects and relations between them, but I am not going to discuss it here more deeply.)

Sometimes it sounds strange to use a functional name as a partial predicate, like in:

29. ‘Peter is a cousin’.

We feel that such a sentence has to be elliptic. Probably it is so because of habitual implicature, for we usually use such concepts like ‘cousin’ in reference to given persons. Nevertheless on the other hand it seems alright to omit the argument in the sentence:

30. ‘Peter is a cousin of one of the children of his parent’s siblings’,

because it is tautological and the complementation in it adds nothing. Other way the content of (29) we can express simply as:

31. ‘Peter has a cousin’

All the three sentences mean that:

32. ‘There is a group of two siblings and their children and Peter is a child in it’.

On the other hand you cannot say similarly:

33. ‘The particular X has a communicational system’ or
34. ‘The object Y has a body.’

Because the relation of having is not clear enough here, perhaps because it is not symmetric as in the case of a cousin.

8. Sign and Reference
What I write above may sound strange because usually we do not use the concept of a sign as functional reference to a communicational system but to an object designated by it like in:

35. ‘‘7’ is a sign for the number seven’ or
36. ‘The word ‘London’ is a sign for London’.

From this point of view the use of the word ‘sign’ as a partial predicate, like in
(21), should refer to a pair of a sign and the object designated by it, e.g. the pair
of the ‘7’ and the number seven, or the word ‘London’ and London.

Actually we have a case of polysemy here and it is based on metonymy (as
usual). The ground for the metonymy is the communicational system where a
communicational process goes on and a particular is a sign in. In the basic
meaning as I claim a particular is a sign when it is a part of such a
communicational system. Nevertheless metonymically you can use the word
‘sign’ to call various relations taking place between parts of the system. Hence
also it is a sign from the point of view of the sender, the content he strives to
communicate, the recipient and the content that is produced in his mind etc.
Some detailed parts of the system are objects that the transmitted content refers
to. So you can also say that the particular is a sign from their point of view. Thus
we obtain several new metonymical meanings of the word ‘sign’. On the other
hand you can think of them as of abridgements of such sentences like:

37. ‘The word ‘London’ is a sign in the communicational system where
the transmitted content refers to London’.

38. ‘The word ‘London’ is a sign that its sender uses to transmit to his
recipient the content that refers to London’.

In fact all the arisen metonymies are abridgements of a similar kind. Similarly
you can say that a leg of a body also is a leg from the point of view of the head,
a hand or a finger. You could say:

39. ‘The object Y is a leg for the head’

and this could be a case of a new (metonymical) sense of the concept of a leg
(leghood in this meaning would be the relation between legs and heads), or you
can take it as an abridgement of a sentence like:

40. ‘The object Y is a leg of the body that the head is a part of’.

9. Sign and Shape
Let me add that the word ‘sign’ is also used in the meaning of a shape that is
(customarily) used as a sign. Cappelen and Lepore talk in this meaning about
sign systems and they distinguish signs from expressions (2007, ch. 12, p.
149f.). As they say signs do not belong to any language but may be used in
communication in any natural language, whereas expressions belong to
particular languages and are expressed with signs of a given system. From my
point of view it is possible because people can use the same shapes as signs in different acts of communication and in different meanings. I call signs in this meaning usable signs or shapes.

10. Sign and Context
Now let me say something about the process of communication. Generally when you communicate there are four areas of particulars:

I. The initial significant behavior of the sender,
II. The significant context: the final significant area of the given sign,
III. The area of reference,
IV. Not mentioned area: the rest of particulars.

When you want to communicate first you have to draw your recipient’s attention to some of your behaviors and to make him interpret them as a sign (as a source of content that he can understand). Usually the initial significant behavior of a sender is speech and manual gestures, or inscriptions on paper or on a screen. This is the initial area of particulars that the recipient perceives and interprets, but during the process of communication the area of interpretation may broaden and include also other moves of the sender’s the body and other particulars like nearby and even quite far objects. For example this what you do with your feet is usually insignificant from the point of view of your conversation but it may happen that you broaden the significant area and your feet are included. The significant context of the phrase ‘the table’ is not only the given table but also the whole close surroundings from which the object is to be isolated, hence for example the whole room in which this is the only table. Thus you have the initial and the final significant area of a sign. The area of reference includes all the particulars that you talk about. It may include the initial significant behavior and the significant context too if you just talk about that. The area of reference of utterances concerning abstract concepts (like kinds) is the question of a debate (my idea is that when you talk about abstract objects in fact you talk about your own mind, the brain, but I am not going to discuss it here).

11. Customary, Conventional and Guessed Sign
The concept of a sign I use here is more general than usually it is in linguistic theories. Usually they say that a sign is the pairing of a kind of physical particular (linguistic form) with a kind of content (e.g. see Ginzburg and Cooper 2014, p. 290). As a theory this account origins probably from de Saussure (1916). A sign in this meaning requires that there is an established agreement or custom concerning communication between the sender and the recipient. The agreement or custom means that it is established for the given linguistic form that it is connected with a content in such a way that when the form is used in communication by the sender then the content appears in the recipient’s mind by
a causal interaction via senses. Signs of this kind I call ‘established signs’ or ‘symbols’. Thus symbols are something narrower than signs. The automatic production of a given content upon perception of a given form is based on conditional reflexes connected with language learning and the phenomenon of agreement.

However notice that if you accept that communication may go upon pure guessing without any pre-existing customs or agreements then the general concept of the sign cannot be based on the existence of a socially or cognitively established practice.

Next to established signs there are also signs which go on without any custom and beyond languages. Let us call them unestablished signs. Symbols origin from them thanks to this that a behavioral interaction which does not rely on a custom or an agreement may become involved into a custom or an agreement. The custom means in fact a conditioned way of creating content in mind (by imagination) upon perception. It delivers a more or less automatic mechanism of content transition from mind to mind. Fresh agreements before they become customs usually need a little help of the conscious will to work. In the case of unestablished signs there is no automatism at all. The content is to be guessed, and before this happens the recipient is to guess also that the sender’s behavior is a sign (an act of communication) at all.

12. Various Metonymical Senses of Sign
In sum by metonymy we use the word ‘sign’ (‘utterance’ etc.) in lots of detailed senses. That is a sketch of the list of basic cases:

I. One type of senses of the sign comes out when we take cases where the communicational system is realized in various numbers of parts:
   a. When an intentionally produced behavior is understood in the intended way by the intended recipient; this is the basic (strict) meaning of the word ‘sign’ (and if you take it as the source of all the metonymies then strictly speaking it is not a metonymy but a direct use),
   b. When an intentionally produced behavior could be understood in the intended way by the intended recipient, but for some reasons it is not, mainly because he is not attentive enough, though it reaches his mind; it is an ‘ununderstood sign’,
   c. When an intentionally produced behavior could be understood in the intended way by the intended recipient, but for some reasons it does not reach his mind, some unplanned obstacles took place; it is an ‘unreceived sign’.
   d. When an intentionally produced behavior could be understood in the intended way by the intended recipient, but the sender produced it in such a manner that it was relatively impossible for the intended recipient to perceive it,
because finally the sender did not want it to be perceived, e.g. he wrote a letter and destroyed it, or spoke something as if to somebody but in loneliness; it is an ‘unsent sign’.

e. When an intentionally produced behavior could be understood in the intended way by the intended recipient, if he existed, but the behavior is intentionally produced toward a fictional being; it is a ‘theatrical sign’.

II. Also we call signs members of relations which are partial in reference to the holistic relation defining a communicational system. Thus for example the relation between a sign and the particular it refers to, they are ‘referential’ signs (see par. 8), or the relation between a sign and the content it produces in the intended recipient’s mind, they are ‘content signs’. III. Some parts of signs in all these meanings we call ‘signs’ too; in this way we call ‘signs’ letters, words, expressions and sentences (for they can be parts of other sentences). They are ‘partial signs’. Letters and phonemes are a kind of partial signs, and they are ‘elementary code signs’. Strings of them are simply ‘code signs’.

IV. And also we use the term ‘sign’ for kinds of signs in all above meanings which are used customarily or by a convention—‘customary’ or ‘conventional’ signs. Customary or conventional content signs I call ‘established’ signs or ‘symbols’ (see par. 11). Constant sentences, expressions and words (not containing indexicals) belong here (see also par. 11 and e.g. Ginzburg and Cooper 2014, p. 290).

V. Kinds of particulars that episodically or customarily are used as code signs may be called signs too, and that is what Cappelen and Lepore call simply signs (2007, p. 149f.), I call them ‘usable’ signs or shapes.

VI. Groups of words similar in form and meaning maybe called various inflectional forms of one word in the inflectional sense, and it is a ‘flectional’ sign.

VII. A generality to which belongs an expression in all possible ways of coding it with code signs (spoken or written with all possible alphabets etc.) is a ‘codable’ sign (that is what Cappelen and Lepore call just an expression, 2007, p. 149f.).

VIII. There is also a problem of objectivity connected with signs. The sign in the basic meaning (I. a.) takes place only when all the parts of the relevant communicational system exist. On the other hand it is possible that the sender believes (by mistake, religion, when dreaming etc.) that all the parts of the intended communicational system exist (or will exist) but he is wrong. Then he performs a ‘subjective sign’ (see also par. 51).

When you talk to yourself then you are one and the same person who is the sender and the recipient of signs. The qualifiers ‘ununderstood’, ‘unreceived’, ‘unsent’ etc. do not name parts of a general kind of signs (they are not differentiae specificae) but they point to various (categorically different)
meanings of the word ‘sign’. Partial or ununderstood signs are simply not signs in the basic meaning (I. a.).

13. Pointing and Performing
Generally you have two basic kinds of communicational behavior:

I. (Direct, gestural) pointing: you can draw your recipient’s attention to a particular present within the surroundings of the conversation.

II. Performing: you can produce a particular with your own behavior.

Often acts of pointing and performing are mixed together. It is when you use nearby objects in your performance, for example when you knock at the table. Then you perform the gesture of knocking with your hand and in the same time you lead your recipient’s attention to the table and also you produce the sound. Writing is in fact an act of pointing to the created material object.

14. Particulars and Kinds
When you point or perform there is always a particular involved—the one that you point to or perform. You can use it in three ways:

I. As the particular you just talk about,

II. To make a reference to another particular or

III. To indicate a generality, like a kind of particulars, a relation between particulars, kind of kinds of particulars etc.

You can make a direct reference to another particular in three ways, i.e. particular you point to or perform may be:

I. An effigy, i.e. similar to the particular you refer to,

II. Associative to the particular you refer to or

III. A token symbol that refers to it.

The similarity of an effigy may be holistic as in the case of another red apple, another token of the sound ‘dog’ or another snap of fingers; or it may be evidently partial as in the case of a man and a black and white photo of him or a car wheel and a circle drawn in the sand. As an associative I mean here something associative in another way than similarity (as keys to a flat and the flat). Usually such association goes upon a relation in time, space or causality and we call it a connection. The difference between associatives and symbols here is that association requires an activity of mind and guessing whereas symbolization goes on automatically upon a habit or with a little help of a reminder about a symbolic convention. Notice that I use the term ‘symbol’ not interchangeably with ‘sign’ but as a partial sign of a detailed kind. In order to
symbolize particulars directly you can use a pure indexical, like ‘this’, or a proper name, like ‘John’.

You can do an indication to a generality in a few ways, i.e. the particular you point to or perform may be:

I. A sample of a kind,
   II. An associative: a sample of a kind that the recipient would probably associate with the given generality,
   III. A symbol of the given generality.

The first option refers to one-argument predicates when you use a single particular, or you can also indicate a relation when you use a group. The last two options relate to any kind of a generality. To decrease the problem of ostension you can use a series of samples and they may be of different kinds (true, apparent or associative) if it is necessary to stimulate your recipient’s perspicacity. (Recanati calls an act of sampling an ‘act of ostensive display’, 2001, p. 639.)

When you talk about snapping fingers you can snap fingers yourself and this would be performing a sample of the kind. You can draw your recipient’s attention to a man snapping fingers nearby and this would be pointing to a sample of the kind. Also you can refer to a sample of snapping fingers with words like ‘the activity performed by a musician with his fingers which was recorded and may be hearable throughout whole Elvis Presley’s ‘Fever’’, and this would be a case of symbolizing a sample of the kind.

Having generalities indicated you can point to particulars with them. Having a kind indicated you can point to an object of the same kind. For example you can point to oranges lying on one table and hence indicate the kind of oranges and then point to another table where an orange lies among other fruits to point to the orange. Also if there is only one particular of a kind within the perceivable context you can point it by naming the kind, like saying ‘the table’, ‘the window’ or ‘the dog’; the article ‘the’ signifies the indexical character of such expressions. There are some additional customs so the particular you point to with a general name need not to be the only one in the second area, for example it may be the closest of the kind in space or time. This is nominal pointing (pointing with general names).

Having a function indicated you can go from some particulars to some other. For example you can point to three pairs of a child and its father to indicate the relation of fatherhood and then point to a child whose father is not present
within the context to refer to him. Another option is using relational expressions, like ‘the son of John’, ‘the chair near the table’ or ‘the apple in your hand’.

And also you can go from some generalities to some other. You can combine general concepts and make definitions, like ‘red apple’. Also you can help your listener to guess which kind you have on mind with a wider kind or a kind of kinds (a generic concept). So you can point to an object and say something like ‘such redness’, ‘this shade of red’, ‘this color’ etc. (the color is a generic concept).

The process is recursive, therefore having new particulars or generalities indicated you can indicate some other new with them. In sum when you refer to particulars with symbols you have generally four options:

I. Pure indexicals,
II. Nominal pointing,
III. Proper nominal pointing and
IV. Relational expressions.

In this point you can treat my theory as a little developed version of the idea of ‘three fundamental methods: indicating, describing, and demonstrating’ by which ‘people perform communicative acts’ that you can find in Clark and Gerrig (1990, p. 765) and earlier in Grice (1957, 1968); finally it origins in Peirce.

Actually Clark and Gerrig (1990, p. 765) use the term ‘demonstration’ for what I call performing a sample of the same kind. Nevertheless here I avoid the term because it makes a terminological mess for it is bisemous. It means 1. pointing to and 2. producing a sample (true or similar). Both these meanings are applied by Davidson in his demonstrative theory of quotation, whereas Clark and Gerrig want to use the term only in the meaning of performing a sample. To avoid misunderstandings I will call demonstration in their meaning ‘sampling’. On the other hand Recanati upholds Davidsonian meaning that includes both senses (2001, footnote 2).

15. Wholes and Parts
You can refer to particulars as to wholes or part by part, so you can say ‘the chair’ or ‘the seat on the four legs with the back’. This is holistic and conjunctive reference.

A simple case of conjunctive general names are ‘structural-descriptive names’. The term was introduced by Tarski (1933, p. 156), concatenations are a detailed case (see par. 23, 42). A general name of this kind is made of other general
names connected by a conjunctive functor, e.g. the functor of concatenation. The functor is the general name of the relation between the elements, called its arguments. Tarski intended the concept for meta-language but it can be used to talk about any kind of objects. The structural-descriptive general name of a chair could be ‘a seat on four legs with a back’.

16. Mixtures
Additionally you can make mixtures of two general kinds. First, your conjunctive references may be made of acts of different kinds like pointing or performing samples, associatives or symbols. Second, your relational expressions, which should rather be called relational constructions then, can contain not only clear indexicals, nominal pointings, proper nominal pointings and some other relational constructions but also they can contain pointing or performing samples, associatives or symbols.

There are also possible parallel mixtures of two or more of pointing or performing samples, associatives or symbols. Onomatopoeias—such words as ‘bang’, ‘chirr’ or ‘twitter’—are a case where performing a sample and a symbol goes together. Also you can speak quickly with short sentences and expressions when describing events which went quickly. Or you can whisper when you talk about soundless events or shout if they were loud. You can speak quietly when talking about a quiet man and so on. This also would be a case of parallel performing a sample and symbolizing.

Similarly Clark and Gerrig speak of two roles that demonstrations play in serious actions (the concept taken from Goffman 1974, utterances are a kind of them). They may be component parts when they are embedded within the serious actions or they may be concurrent with them (1990, p. 766). And now that is all for the short sketch of the general theory of communication and sign.

17. Quoting as Pretending
All the presented options you can use also when referring to a kind of an utterance. Nevertheless only one of them I propose to call a quotation (or a quote)—an act of performing a sample of a kind of particulars used as signs in communicational systems of a kind in order to refer to the kind of communicational systems (this reference goes upon the connection of a part and the whole) and to mark that particulars of the former kind are used as signs in communicational systems of the latter kind. The act of performing a quote you can call an act of pretending, i.e. performing behavior of a kind with its material effects (like inscriptions) included but without the original meaning, as in the case of an actor playing hate or love. Quoting part by part is not one quote but a series of quotes (see par. 42). Davidson (1979) uses the term ‘quotation’ also for pointing, but he goes too far I think.
Intuitively pretending, for it is similar to the original particular, is closer to it than a symbol (for this may be entirely different), hence it is the basis of the feeling of the close relation between an utterance and its quote (see Cappelen and Lepore 2012, BQ4). Of course a sample of the same kind would be more close but a quote is not a sample of a sign, which I explain below (see par. 20).

The imitative character of quotation explains how we can use and understand an infinite number of possible quotes. That is because our ability to pretend acts of communication is infinite, and so is our ability to understand them as act of pretending acts of communication (see Cappelen and Lepore 2012, BQ5).

18. Using Quotes
Thus quotes denote kinds. You can use the idea of a kind (a predicate) basically in four ways (I do not want to raise the problem of universals here thus points 3 and 4 must do):

I. Particularly: To refer to a particular you talk about (as a logical individual name or a part of it) or
II. Unitarily: To ascribe a property to a particular (as a logical unitary predicate or a part of it) or
III. Abstractively: To refer to an abstract object you talk about (as a logical individual name of an abstract object or a part of it).
IV. Generically: To ascribe a property to an abstract (as a logical generic predicate or a part of it).

For example you can say:

41. ‘The red one is fast’ (particularly of a car),
42. ‘The car is red’ (unitarily),
43. ‘Red is a color’ (abstractively),
44. ‘Blood is red’ (generically).

All the same you can do with quotes:

45. ‘‘I love you’ was nice’ (particularly of an utterance),
46. ‘He said ‘I love you’’ (unitarily),
47. ‘‘I love you’ is a sentence’ (abstractively),
48. ‘Lovers say ‘I love you’’ (generically).

(See also Clark and Gerrig 1990, p. 772f., for particular use of quotes.) They call unitary use of a quote ‘specific’, whereas the term ‘generic’ I took from them
Abstractive use of quotes is called technically citation (see Saka 2013, p. 937).

19. Quoting Signs and Imitating Shapes
In order to explain what exactly is my view on quotation I will present the difference between it and the most close theories of other authors which representatives are Davidson (1979), Clark and Gerrig (1990) and Recanati (2000, 2001, 2008).

Even if you agree that quotation is a sample there are still a few possibilities concerning the object and the reference of the sample. Thus you can say that a quote is a sample of a shape (that is not a sign but may be used as a sign) or you can say that it is a sample of a sign. And you can say that it refers to a shape or that it refers to a sign. It makes four possible theses about quotation. You can claim that a quote is

I. A sample of a shape in order to refer to a shape,
II. A sample of a shape in order to refer to a sign,
III. A sample of a sign in order to refer to a shape or
IV. A sample of a sign in order to refer to a sign.

My thesis is that true is the claim II (a shape to a sign), i.e. that quotation is an act of pretending the original sign with use of its shape (see par. 17). The reference from shapes to shapes I will call ‘imitation’. When I speak of a reference to a sign it actually stands for the formula: ‘reference to a shape and to the communicational system in which the shape was used as a sign in order to mark that the shape was used as a sign in a given communicational system’.

Thus I claim that quotation is not an act of imitation. When you snap your fingers you do not quote anybody that has snapped, when you sneeze you do not quote, even if you do this in a way very similar to a given person, when you scrape your nose like a friend of yours used to you do not quote—just you imitate. Sometimes you can even use quotation marks:

49. ‘The machine made a ‘roar’ sound’.

but you do not quote saying so. Actually quotation marks are used in “‘roar’” not to indicate a quote but merely a reference to a sound (as in claim I). Thus they play the role of imitation signs here and in fact a different symbol than “…” could be used.

It seems that the natural way of speaking of quotation takes the option IV. Naturally we speak that a quotation is a sign (words, a sentence) used in a
different way than usually to refer to another token of the same sign (word, sentence) or to the type of signs it represents. Almost all researchers of quotation literally (verbally) accept this natural way of speaking. The extreme case of this is Washington’s identity theory (1992). However it is hard to tell if all they really think that particulars used in quotations are real words, and that they do not use such words like ‘word’ and ‘sentence’ equivocatively mixing for example signs and code signs (or e.g. codable and usable signs, ‘expressions’ and ‘signs’ in Cappelen and Lepore’s terminology, 2007, p. 149f.) or something else. They are to a degree conscious that there is a problem. For example Davidson writes that:

‘It is in fact confusing to speak of them as words’ (1979, p. 90),

and Recanati admits that in quotation the ‘word itself is used, though deviantly’ (2000, p. 137). Nevertheless they do not draw any clear conclusions from such doubts. By the way it seems that Cappelen and Lepore entirely consciously write that:

‘if a quotation expression quotes an expression, then that expression must be a constituent of that quotation expression’ (2007, p. 151).

Actually Davidson sometimes goes beyond the natural way of speaking and uses the word ‘shape’ in a way that seems to mean something different than ‘sign’. But in this point he is dark as usual, thus if you take my distinction between shapes and signs literally then statements containing the word ‘shape’ comprise a chaos. Take the words that begin his paper:

Quotation is a device used to refer to typographical or phonetic shapes by exhibiting samples, that is, inscriptions or utterances that have those shapes. (1979, p. 79).

Literally it applies reference from signs to shapes (thesis III). Literally it seems that Davidson means samples of signs because he distinguishes them from their shapes and he really means reference to shapes because he underlines this with the adjectives ‘typographical’ and ‘phonetic’. Near the end of the text he writes that:

‘the quotation marks (...) may be read ‘the expression a token of which is here’’ (p. 90).

Literally it expresses the natural way of speaking—the reference form a sign (expression) to a sign, Nevertheless in the next sentence he suggests that the alternative version would be ‘the expression with the shape here pictured’, and this literally would be the reference from a shape to a sign (thesis II, my option!). It is also possible that Recanati is right and you should interpret
Davidson’s words in the following way: ‘shape’ as ‘type [of signs]’ and ‘something that has it’ as ‘a token of the type’ (Recanati 2001, p. 639). Then there would be no breach of the natural intuition in Davidson’s.

Now I should present my arguments against the natural intuition view, hence thesis IV, but let me first explain why I think thesis I is wrong. I claim (as everybody does) that quotations refer to signs. Why is this? First it seems that in sentences:

50. ‘Dog’ has three letters
51. ‘The word ‘dog’ has three letters’

the quote ‘‘dog’’ is exactly the same. Second, it seems that in such expressions like ‘the letter ‘L’’, ‘the word ‘dog’’, ‘the expression ‘black dog’’, ‘the ‘phrase ‘like a black dog’’, ‘the sentence ‘I love you’’ the first item plays an auxiliary role similarly as in such expressions like ‘king Arthur’, ‘Mount Olympus’, ‘The River Thames’, ‘the song ‘Love Me Tender’’ etc. The sentences:

52. ‘Arthur was brave’,
53. ‘King Arthur was brave’

mean the same and the word ‘king’ adds nothing here from the compositional point of view because the word ‘Arthur’ is entirely sufficient to make the reference to the proper person. The word merely helps—it presents the kind of the object which is named just next to it—that it is a king. Words like ‘word’, ‘sentence’ etc. do exactly the same. They inform what the kind is of things that the logical names coming after them (which are quotes) refer to. They inform that the latter are signs. Thus quotations refer to signs if this use of words is correct. We do not have any reasons to doubt it. Also it seems that in cases where it is impossible to add to the quote such a phrase like ‘the word’ or ‘the sentence’—in open quotations and in denizen isolated quotes (like in ‘I-love-you-ly they spent the night’, see par. 31, 32)—the referential function of quotes is still the same, so they also refer to signs. Thus the theses I and III are false.

20. Quoting a Part of Communicational Process

Now what is my argument against the claim (which follows the natural intuition) that quotation is a token of the same sign it refers to (thesis IV)? When you realize that a given sign is a part of a communicational system where all the parts are important you see that the idea of exact samples is not appropriate for quotation. If quoting a sign were to be producing a full sample of the kind of signs it would require to reproduce the whole communicational process. Say Mary told ‘Eat!’ to John with the intention that he would eat the apple he was keeping in his hand. The exact sampling her utterance would require, for
instance, that you would have to intend to make your listener to eat an apple that he would be keeping in his hand, hence he would have to be keeping an apple in his hand etc. This is not what we mean when quoting (see for similar remarks in Clark and Gerrig 1990, p. 764, 800). Thus quotation is not a sample of a kind of signs. Merely it is a reproduction of the particular which was the part of the communicational process, yet without the whole rest of the process it is not a sign.

You can sample a sign but only in these specific cases when you really want to say this what the utterance sentence claim, e.g.:

54. ‘I like to discuss the problem of quotation with you. That was a sentence.’

21. Davidson’s ‘Alice swooned’ as Shape

That is why I cannot accept Davidson’s analysis of his example of the sentence ‘Alice swooned’. He claims that the sentence:

55. ‘‘Alice swooned’ is a sentence.’

you could write it as:

56. ‘Alice swooned. The expression of which this is a token is a sentence.’

(p. 91)

Yes, you could, but only if you wanted to say that Alice had swooned. Nevertheless generally you do not want to say this, so these two formulas are not equivalent. The latter is a conjunction and you can say this truly only if you want to say what the first member claims, i.e. that Alice swooned. For sure it is not the case that you do want to claim yourself all the sentences that you quote. Davidson could defend that this is a sham uttering a sentence. But a sham uttering a sentence is not uttering a sentence. It is uttering a sham sentence and you cannot say that it is a token or a sample of the sign.

Some readers (among others one of the referees of a rejected version of this article) claim that according to Davidson the shape put between quotation marks does not refer to anything, so it cannot be considered as a sign, and hence it would mean that he rejects theses 3 and 4. In my opinion, even if he somehow intuitively felt this way, he was not consistent and the case of the sentence ‘Alice swooned’ shows this. If the sentence were not to be used seriously then the whole phrase should look like:
57. ‘‘Alice swooned’. The expression of which this is a token is a sentence’,

but then the whole explanation would miss the point. Of course according to my theory such a phrase is wrong and in fact it should be something like:

58. ‘‘Alice swooned’. The shape of which this is a token may be used as a sentence’.

22. Open quotations as Shapes
Similarly an open quotation cannot be taken as a sample (‘display’) of an expression as Recanati wants (2000, p. 182). His examples are:

59. ‘‘Comment allez vous?’ That is how you would translate ‘How do you do?’ in French.’

60. ‘Stop that John! ‘Nobody likes me.’ ‘I am miserable.’ Don't you think you exaggerate a bit?’

He claims that in such cases the sentences ‘Comment allez vous?’, ‘Nobody likes me.’, ‘I am miserable.’ are truly spoken by the speaker. But they cannot be. If that be the case the speaker would have to say for himself that nobody likes him or that he is miserable, or he would have to ask his recipient truly how does he do in French. Only then these spoken sounds would be mentioned sentences. Actually the speaker utters the sounds but do not utter the sentences. These sounds refer to these sentences but they are not them, they stand for them. Let me mention that I do not agree with Recanati’s claim that open quotation does not make any reference (p. 182). They are sounds that serve to refer to signs as any other spoken quote, their openness changes nothing.

23. Disquotational Approach
For similar reasons I reject the disquotational theory of quotation formulated in that manner that it is the expression itself what is put between the quotation marks as in Richard’s schema:

61. ‘For any expression e, the left quote (lq) followed by e followed by the right quote (rq) denotes e’ (1986, p. 397).

Let me say it again. What is placed between quotation marks is not the expression itself, it is the shape of it. It is not a sign because you do not use it to transmit the content which would come out from the meaning of it if it were used as a sign in the relevant communicational system. When you quote the word ‘dog’ you do not do this to talk about dogs but about the word ‘dog’. The
shape ‘dog’ is the word ‘dog’ only when you talk about dogs. When you talk about words you use mere shapes and they merely look similar.

The main problem here is that when you produce the shape of a word then you have only two options:

I. You can use it as the word and then the shape becomes the word or
II. You can use it to talk about the word and then the shape becomes the quote of the word.

These two options are traditionally called use and mention a sign, whereas actually they are two ways of use the shape of a sign. For example with the shape ‘dog’ you can talk about dogs or about the word ‘dog’. I hope that the whole my theory shows in details that there is no other option. And this is what makes the disquotational approach impossible to express if you want to have a place in the formula where the expression is left without quotes, so that it would look really disquotationally. You can see it easily when you want to put a particular word, say ‘dog’, into Richard’s formula (1986, p. 397):

62. ‘The left quote (lq) followed by dog followed by the right quote (rq) denotes dog’.

Thus you obtain an obvious absurd because you cannot put a dog between left and right quotes and it would not denote dog. Of course you can write it as:

63. ‘The left quote (lq) followed by ‘dog’ followed by the right quote (rq) denotes ‘dog’’

but it is not elegantly disquotational. Additionally I do not think that this formula is correct, because what embraced is with quotation marks is not the word ‘dog’—because you do not talk about dogs now within the quote, thus you cannot write within the formula ‘followed by the word ‘dog’’—but the shape of it, i.e. the quote, i.e. ‘‘dog’’. Therefore when you describe the structure and reference of a quote you have to iterate quotation marks:

64. ‘The left quote (lq) followed by ‘‘dog’’ followed by the right quote (rq) denotes ‘dog’’

Take also Ludwig and Ray’s formula (1998, p.163, note 43):

65. ‘\text{ref}(^\text{\`E`}^) = E`
where ‘^…^’ means Quine’s quasi-quotation marks (Quine, 1940), and ‘ref’ is the referent function. Seeking for a proper formulation they came to this disquotational formula that when substituted leads to an absurd again. In case of the word ‘dog’ we have:

\[ \text{ref}('\text{dog}') = \text{dog} \]

And this simply means that the referent of the quote ‘‘dog’’ is a dog (an animal), whereas actually the referent of the quote ‘‘dog’’ is the word ‘dog’. It seems that they wanted that the shape ‘dog’ at the right sight of the formula meant neither a quote ‘‘dog’’ nor a living dog but the expression itself but such the third option does not exist. When you use the shape ‘dog’ without quotation marks you inevitably talk about dogs.

Evidently Cappelen and Lepore drew the conclusion from similar considerations and when they consider ‘Disquotational Schema for Quotation’ they put it resigning from the purely disquotational form (2007, p. 25):

\[ \text{‘‘e’’ quotes ‘e’} \]

Therefore marks do not make a quotation. They merely label it. Similarly, question mark does not make a question. It marks it. Quotation is not made from a word put into quotation marks before and after. This what is put between the marks is already a quote, i.e. the shape of a word. Davidson writes the opposite (1979, p. 91) and I think he is wrong. Contrary to him a conception which he calls ‘the picture theory’ (1979, p. 83) is closer to the truth. After all this idea—as he sketches it (though it is not easy to reconstruct it upon the sketch)—does not hit the mark because it still uses the concept of a sign (1979, p. 84) as what is put between quotation marks.

Marks perform a similar work as the expression ‘in the logical sense’ in the phrase ‘a name in the logical sense’, they point to the intended sense of the communicational behavior which is one many possible. They inform that a given phrase is a quote, but still it would be a quote without them, as it is in speech. Washington is right in this point (1992, p. 557).

I have to admit that the problem of quotations is as difficult that when you consider it you may never stop to pay the closest attention to use all the concepts strictly in their intended senses. It is very easy to commit a categorical mistake. I am sorry to tell but actually Richard uses the term ‘concatenation’ not in the primary sense of structural-descriptive names introduced by Tarski (1933, p. 156, 172). He writes:
68. ‘For each concatenate \( e \), the left quote (lq), followed by \( e \), followed by the right quote (rq) is a singular term’ (1986, p. 389).

This statement suggests that he means quotation, seeing that the term is to begin and end with a quotation mark. And this suggests that he means as concatenations sequences of letters—many-letter usable shapes. Unfortunately it seems that he confuses words with their referents here. He wants to get there a sequence of letters but instead he puts its name. The shape ‘dog’ is not a concatenation. It is rather a mereological set of sounds appearing one after another or of patches printed or written on paper one next to another. It is a kind of physical particular. Instead a concatenation is a kind of name with which we can refer to such sets. It is so called structural-descriptive name. It consists of names of elements of such a set and of the name of relation of the connection between them (concatenation). A structural descriptive name of the printed shape ‘dog’ may be ‘dee^oh^gee’, where ‘dee’, ‘oh’, ‘gee’ are the names of letters comprising the shape and ‘…^…’ is the sign of concatenation (the sign of this that the letters go one after another). Thus if you follow Richard and make the said ‘singular term’ in the case of the word ‘dog’ you obtain ‘‘dee^oh^gee’’, and this does not look like the quote ‘‘dog’’.

The general problem with the disquotational idea that quotation is a function and that quotation marks are its symbol is that in a functional expression like ‘\( f(x) \)’ in the part of the argument ‘(…)’ you have to put a name. When you do this the function works upon referents of the names, and not the names itself. Nevertheless not all quoted expressions are names, and even if they are it seems obvious that the quoting function should not have as its arguments dogs for example (cf. Davidson’s remark on the picture theory, 1979, p. 85).

24. Identity Theory
Let us get to the identity theory for a while. I think that it is wrong literally because what stands between the quotation marks is not an expression but merely a shape of it. Nevertheless the general intuition is correct. In quotation you use the same sound (behavior, material object) but you use it in a different way than in the original communication (cf. Washington 1992, p. 557). The sound is the same but the function is different. So you can speak of communicational (a sign, an expression) and quotational (a shape) use of a sound or a patch on paper. The problem with identity theory is that you should not say that you use the expression in a different way, because an expression is a sign and it cannot exist outside the communicational process—hence you can use it only in one way, and you have to come down to the word ‘sound’ or ‘shape’. Similarly you cannot say that you use a table leg in a different way, say as a walking stick, because when it does not serve as a leg of a table it is not a leg at all. Instead you can say that you use the same piece of wood in a different
way. (Saying this I do not want to claim that you cannot say you use a table leg as a stick. Of course you can. Only I want to say that what allows to do it is not any strict meaning of the word ‘leg’ but the metonymicity of natural language, and this lets you to jump between strict senses of words without noticing it. Simply I claim that you cannot say this if you keep the meaning of the word ‘leg’ that I call the basic one here.) Therefore Washington’s statements:

The quotation as a whole is analyzed into the marks that signify quotational use of the quoted expression and the quoted expression itself used to mention an object. All expressions, even those whose standard uses are not as mentioning expressions, become mentioning expressions in quotation (Washington 1992, p. 557),

would be entirely acceptable, if the word ‘expression’ were replaced with the word ‘sound’ or ‘shape’. Of course his further claim:

a quoted expression is related to its value by identity: a quoted expression mentions itself (Washington 1992, p. 557),

is for me unacceptable.

25. Various Metonymical Senses of Quote
I hope that you remember the vast list of basic metonymically connected meanings of the word ‘sign’, and of such words like ‘sentence’, ‘expression’ or ‘word’ too (par. 12). Upon the variety, the general intuition that you quote a sign gives a vast diversity of senses of the term ‘quotation’. But these are not all the meanings of the term. The first family of senses stems by various associations from the strict sense of the term ‘sign’ (par. 12 point I. a.). Nevertheless there is also another group of metonymical meanings that stems from the imitative aspect of an act of quotation. Generally any act of imitating or demonstrating a kind with behavior or with producing some material objects could be by association called ‘quotation’. However we usually feel that it would go too far, and we restrict the term to situations somehow connected with language. Thus for example when we imitate a sound using phonemes of a language or afterward writing it down then it is similar to quoting usable signs (see par. 12 point IV) and by similarity we even use quotation marks (as in (49)). Notice that you do not call quote an imitation of one’s breathing sounds if they cannot be taken as a sequence of phonemes. And also per analogiam to quoting passages of literary works, we speak of quoting fragments of music, paintings or films.

Let me introduce a convention here of using the terms ‘sign’ and ‘shape’. Notwithstanding the mentioned variety of meanings let us use the word ‘sign’ and words like ‘sentence’, ‘expression’ or ‘word’ when we mean a sign connected with a given meaning (with producing content), and let us use the term ‘shape’ and words like ‘sound’, ‘patch’, ‘curvy line on paper’ etc., when
we mean a mere shape of a particular which may be used as a sign having a meaning. (Signs in this meaning include Cappelen and Lepore’s expressions, and shapes include their signs (2007, p. 149f.). (I do not include the word ‘inscription’ to shapes, because inscriptions—as the result of writing—manifest themselves as pieces of communication and not as simple drawing curvy lines, hence they are connected with a given meaning.)

This convention infringes our natural way of speaking and has some practical consequences. For example it forbids to say something like:

69. ‘The word ‘sign’ has four meanings’

because evidently the shape ‘sign’ is not used here as having an established meaning but as a basis upon which some meanings may be loaded. Hence it should be:

70. ‘The shape ‘sign’ has four meanings’

(see example 12.1 in Cappelen and Lepore, 2007, p. 149). On the other hand such sentence like:

71. ‘The word ‘sign’ has four letters’

is allowed because still it may be that the word appears here in a given meaning, and the attention paid to its code structure does not change it (cf. Cappelen and Lepore 2007, example 12.2, p. 150). I will strive to obey this convention till the end of this article starting from now carefully.

The second convention says that in cases when we use the word ‘sign’ (and similar) we speak of quotation or citation whereas in cases when we have shapes we speak of imitation. Thus in (70) we have imitation but not a citation. The symbol ‘‘…’’ we can call quotation marks in both cases because it is the name of a shape merely, though actually it has different meaning in cases of quotation and imitation—it designates a different aim of reference:

I. In quotes—to a particular and the communicational system in which it is a sign whereas
II. In imitations—simply to a particular.

Thus I do not agree with Cappelen and Lepore in this point, because they insist that imitations are also quotations, so they use one term for both, and they see the difference in quotable items: usable shapes and codable signs (‘signs’ and ‘expressions’ in their terminology, 2007, p. 151).
Cappelen and Lepore claim also as obvious that quotations must be articulated with usable shapes (they call them simply ‘signs’, see par. 12 point V) because they belong to natural languages (2007, p. 149). That is for sure correct in reference to quotes that we usually do in everyday conversations. Nevertheless it seems that it is possible to quote any sign even unarticulated (analphabetical) like some improvised one-time gestures, drawings or sounds. For example say that a group of friends went to the countryside for camping. In the afternoon John made a slurping sound and pointed to the village where was a pub. Everybody understood that he wanted to go there and have something. When Mary came back from the walk she asked Peter: ‘Where is everybody?’ and Peter answered ‘They went ‘#’’ where the sign ‘#’ designates the slurping sound that Peter repeated after John. It seems that we can say that it was a quote. The important point is that the sound was used as a sign by John and Peter repeated it as referring to the sign used by him.

26. Davidson’s Demonstrative Theory of Quotation

The reason why Davidson includes pointing to quotation is that generally he claims that quotation marks are a device which serve to point to a token of the quoted expression no matter if this is uttered by the quotator or somebody else (1979). He writes for example that quotation marks ‘help refer to a shape by pointing out something that has it’ (p. 90). I think that he is wrong because pointing and performing are two different kinds of communicational activity. Quoting relies not on pointing to a sample of a shape but on performing it. The reason of Davidson mistake is that he confuses two different kinds of drawing the attention of the listener.

The necessary condition of any communication is that the sender draws the attention of the recipient. The concentration of the listener is needed for him to perceive the message with all the important details. That is why the recipient for the whole time of the message transmission is to be perceptually focused on the sender’s communicational deeds and the sender has to watch if the listener pays attention. So in a wide sense you can say that all the communicational stuff that the sender does he shows to the recipient. He says to him silently ‘look or hear what I do’. But this showing, presenting or displaying is not pointing. That is what Clark and Gerrig do not see too, even if they distinguish pointing and locating attention of the recipient (1990, footnote 4) and they distinguish sampling (‘demonstrating’) and pointing (‘indicating’) (p. 767).

Pointing is a next level activity. When you keep your recipient’s attention you can make some gestures which lead his perceptual attention to some objects or processes directly accessible to his senses in the given moment, for example you can make a gesture with your hand and lead his attention to a chair standing
nearby. This is direct pointing. Or you can stimulate his knowledge and imagination to draw his attention to something that is not present in the nearby surroundings of your conversation but that he would recall or imagine in his mind. Sometimes you force him to guess it. This is the thought pointing. Generally pointing is manipulating your recipient’s attention when you already have it. Obtaining attention is not pointing. This is attracting attention which is necessary for communication at all, whereas pointing is moving the attention area. The difference is as with buying a car and driving it.

When you use words with established meaning or when you sample you act on the basis of your listener’s attention which already you have obtained but you do not manipulate it. This is why pretending, and thus quoting, is not pointing. The role of quotation marks is not to point to anything. They are to inform the recipient that the given part of your utterance is not composed from established signs but from shapes referring to signs.

27. Logical Names

It is important to distinguish the sense of the term ‘name’ which I use here, which I call the symbolic meaning of the term for names are symbols here, from another meaning which may be found in logical contexts, hence I call it logical. A logical name is any communicational act which refers to a particular or a kind (intuitively: that is what we use to speak of particulars or kinds), and so it is different from for example connectives or operators (though connectives and operators may be parts of logical names). The idea of a name in this meaning is based only on what it refers to. An atomic proposition states that a particular belongs to a kind or that there is a relation of a kind in a group of particulars (word has it that additionally there are propositions speaking of ideal objects only which are not equivalent to propositions of any particulars; I do not believe so, but I do not want to start the discussions here). Thus a sentence which expresses a proposition has to contain some parts or aspects which inform what particulars and kinds it is about, the parts or aspects are names in the wide (logical) sense. The concept is so general that any behavior which makes a reference to a particular is a name in the logical meaning. All the six types of communicational behavior enumerated above (pointing or performing samples, associatives or symbols) are included, no matter if they are performed with words, even pointing to an object with your hand is a logical name, because it makes a reference to it (even when it is not efficient, i.e. even though the pointed object does not exist). Hence the expression ‘this that Peter and Jane did’, the quote ‘Mary loves Peter’ and proper names like ‘Mary’ and ‘John’ are names in the logical sense as well. (The idea of logical name, in the shape I propose here, seems to me very intuitive though I cannot recall any other author presenting it clearly enough. I suppose that it was the background of the proper name theory of quotation, see below.)
28. Linguistic Names
There is also the third important meaning of the term ‘name’ which I have to mention here—the linguistic one. ‘Mary’, ‘dog’, ‘yellow dog’ and ‘the dog that bit me yesterday’ are names in this sense. Then linguistic names are similar to noun phrases, however in English the latter require determiners (thus ‘dog’ and ‘yellow dog’ are not full noun phrases). Names in the symbolic and logical sense need not be linguistic names. There is no particular relation between the former two and the latter. You can make a reference to an object or a kind with a word from any form class, e.g. you can refer to America with a noun, a verb, an adjective, an adverb etc.: ‘America’, ‘Americanize’, ‘American’, ‘Americanly’ respectively, though some of them may be not in use, as the latter here (they all are logical and symbolic names). In the case of quotes, as I claim, it is also possible that they may appear under the surface cover of a clause, as it is in that-clauses (see par. 48-53). (If it is not labeled I mean symbolic names as names below.)

29. Quotation and Associating Mechanism
In order to use a name in communication the mechanism of understanding the name has to exist in the recipient’s mind previously. This makes a criterion for established names usage: no naming if your recipient has not known the name before.

Actually there is a problem with this criterion. It comes out from the way the conditional meaning mechanism is produced in mind. When a word (any communicational act) obtains an established communicational meaning we call it baptizing. There are many types of this process. Generally you can distinguish two main ones:

I. Mentional (linguistic or meta-language) type and
II. Practical (use) type.

The difference bases on the mention and use opposition (see par. 23). Mentional baptizing means that you explicitly inform the learner what the meaning of the given word is, for example John can say ‘The word ‘John’ refers to me’. If he said ‘I am John’ this would be of the same kind but a less obvious case (this would be a real definition whereas the former is a nominal one; real definitions are similar to that-clauses, see par. 48-53). The main point here is that you talk about (refer to) words or phrases. For example with the quotation “John” you talk about the word ‘John’. Instead practical baptizing means that the learner guesses the meaning upon being a witness or the recipient of a use of the given word in an intentionally communicational behavior. Peter could hear one saying ‘John talks to Peter’, and guess that the name of the person talking to him is
‘John’. (The phrase ‘intentionally communicational behavior’ means that the sender intended communication but it is possible that he has not succeeded because of many possible reasons, for example that he has not been understood for the recipient does not know a word, cf. par. 12 point I. b. and c.)

Say that you hear the sentence:

72. ‘John took a chiguarra from the table’

and you see that actually he took an apple. Then you automatically understand that ‘chiguarra’ means an ‘apple’ here, or something similar like a detailed kind of apples. Hence ‘chiguarra’ is a name of a kind which is successfully used here and introduced (baptized) in the same time. Thus what goes on when you hear:

73. ‘John said ‘Mary loves Peter’’?

Say that you heard John saying ‘Mary loves Peter’ a moment ago and that he said these words and nothing else, and afterward somebody said the above sentence. Such a situation seems to be very similar to the event with the apple. Therefore why not agree that you understand automatically that ‘Mary loves Peter’ is a new name (baptized in this way) for the kind of utterance John has performed a while ago as it is in the apple case?

It is not a name because the way this kind of utterance is understood by you is not symbolizing but perceiving a shape. This is not a baptism because no symbol arises. The quote ‘‘Mary loves Peter’’ does not become an expression that is kept in your memory in such a way that after you hear it it appears in your mind that one utters ‘Mary loves Peter’, as it could be with ‘chiguarra’ (that it induces the idea of an apple) if you remembered that. Usually quotes are forgotten. They are not names because they do not work in mind like symbols. They help you to guess one’s utterances upon the explicit picture. Even in the case of usual quotes like ‘cogito ergo sum’ or ‘gavagai’, the process of symbolization (producing the associating mechanism) does not go on. Perhaps because it would be redundant. You do not have to remember anything if everything that is necessary you obtain without it. (As an idea, a representation, I do not mean a sensual imagination but any presence of the given content in mind, though perceptual picture may happen sometimes as well.)

Thus I cannot accept the so called name theory of quotation (considered by Tarski 1933, p. 159ff, Quine 1940, pp. 23-26). For example Tarski wrote:
Every quotation-mark name is then a constant individual name of a definite expression (the expression enclosed by the quotation marks) and is in fact a name of the same nature as the proper name of a man. (Tarski 1933, p. 159)

According to my argument this conception is wrong, and it is worth to state here why it is so even if the theory is not claimed by anyone at present (cf. Cappelen and Lepore 2012, par. 3.1). Let me also discuss onomatopoeias and quotes introduced to the language system. The problem of practical baptizing we leave here save a short remark below (par. 37).

30. Onomatopoeias
Onomatopoeias are names for sounds, even some sounds of speech, like ‘murmur’, but they do not contain information of the structure of the sound—the sequence of more detailed partial sounds like phonemes. They represent the similarity type of speech but usually they are not quotes. A quote is not a mere reproduction of a physical event, but it contains details which are important for the meaning of the event as the given sign. In the case of speech the phonetic structure is crucial. Therefore an extreme exception could be if an onomatopoeia named a simple sign, whose structure is not important, for example if the mere fact of murmuring were a sign no matter what words were spoken. Then it would reproduce what made the meaning of the sign—the sheer murmuring—and hence the onomatopoeia ‘murmur’ would be a quote then (cf. the slurping case in par. 25).

31. Foreign and Denizen Quotes
Many quotes appear in speech as a foreign body. The stream of a grammatically structured utterance is stopped, then the quote goes on and after it is finished the grammatically proper mode of speaking the language returns. There are generally two kinds of such quotations. The first one are so called open quotations (for the first time observed by Recanati 2000, p. 182, 2001, 2008). They are intruders in the stream of grammatically proper sentences of a language but they appear independently and they possess the status similar to a sentence. In cases:

74. ‘Five dogs’ That is all I heard’,
75. ‘Oh’ That is all I heard’,

‘Five dogs’ and ‘Oh’ are open quotations (see also par. 22). Quotations of the second kind are parts of normal sentences and they are used similarly to nouns, because they are usually preceded with words like ‘word’, ‘expression’, ‘sentence’, and they may be substituted with such words like ‘it’ or ‘this’. But they are not usual nouns, because for example you cannot make a plural of them or use them as an attribute in a compound noun phrase (as ‘dog’ in ‘some dog
food’). In the case of flectional languages (like German) the difference is better visible because such quotes are not inflected by cases. Let us call such quotations ‘foreign’.

But also a quotation may be introduced into the syntactic system of a language, and play there a role of a given form class with all the consequences. Mary may say to Jane about John:

76. ‘I hate his I-love-you-s’

‘I-love-you-s’ is a plural of ‘I-love-you’, and this is a noun. You can use it as an attribute too:

77. ‘That was an I-love-you conversation’.

Nouns are not the only possibility. You can make quote verbs too:

78. ‘And then he I-love-you-ed her’.

or adverbs:

79. ‘I-love-you-ly they spent whole the evening’.

Let us call such quotations ‘denizen’ (see also examples presented by Clark and Gerrig, 1990, p. 771ff.). The important thing is they are not onomatopoeias. They belong to various form classes but still they are not symbolic names but shapes. They have no constant and remembered meaning, but always their meaning comes out from the explicit shape which is perceived in the moment of listening. In fact in the previous example you can replace ‘I-love-you’ with any other quote and the only question is if the listener understands you, for instance:

80. ‘I-hate-you-and-I-will-never-forgive-you-ly they spent whole the evening’.

(the written version is much better understandable than a spoken one here).

32. Isolated and Assimilated Denizen Quotes

Even such denizen quotes as ‘I-love-you’ are syntactically isolated from the quoting sentence. From the point of view of the sentence in which it is used such a quote is syntactically simple, even if it is structured and the structure is understandable for the quotation listener. That is why generally I agree with these remarks of Quine and Tarski where they put similar claims (Quine 1940,
p. 26, Tarski 1933, p. 159), if they refer to isolated quotes. It seems what Davidson meant when he wrote that:

> those words within quotation marks are not, from a semantical point of view, part of the sentence at all (1979, p. 90).

(as I understand he refers to the syntactical question with the term ‘semantical’ having in mind the idea of semantical compositionality; similarly Recanati writes in this point about ‘semantic inertia of quoted words’, 2000, p. 183). (For the sake of simplicity I will speak that foreign quotes are isolated too, thus the term ‘isolated’ is a bit wider that ‘foreign’ for it includes also isolated denizen quotes).

Nevertheless there is also the assimilated kind of denizen quotes which are not syntactically isolated from the quoting sentence. This goes on in that-clauses. I give some remarks on them below (par. 48-53). Thus we have three kinds of quotation if the relation between the syntax of the quoted and the quoting sentence is concerned:

I. Foreign (isolated) quotes: the quotation stands outside of the syntactic structure of the quoting sentence, in writing we usually label it with quotation marks, like in:

81. ‘Peter said ‘I love you’’.

II. Denizen isolated quotes: the quotation as a whole is a part of the syntactic structure of the quoting sentence, like in:

82. ‘I hate his I-love-you-s’.

III. Denizen assimilated quotes: the syntactic structure of a quotation is a part of the syntactic structure of the quoting sentence, like in:

83. ‘Peter said that he loved her’.

(More about denizen assimilated quotes see pars. 20-22.)

**33. Syntax of Quoting Sentence and Quote**

An isolated quotation is like a ship in the middle of the land. You can understand that you could ride the boat if it were put into the water but in the middle of a land its floating features are lost and it is worth no more than a wreck of a car or a rock. You can imagine what sign a quote would be if it were used as a part of a communicational system but it loses all its meaning features
when merely quoted, hence it is not a the original sign in the middle of the quoting sentence. Davidson writes:

> ‘its use in quotation is unrelated to its meaning in the language; so the quoted material is not used as a piece of language’ (1979, p. 80).

Brutally speaking it is so because a quote is not a language activity at all (it is communication but not language). It is merely a reproduction of one’s language behavior, of one’s moves of mouth or of some lines drawn on a sheet of paper etc. Quoted words merely sound like words but they are not words, they are merely samples of word-sounds.

Languages are sets (systems) of symbols (see par. 11) whereas in quotations there are no symbols. They do not belong to any given language. The sentences:

84. ‘John said ‘I saw Anna and a man’’ and
85. ‘John said ‘Ich sah Anna und einen Man’

are equally sentences of English because the language of the quoted sentence has nothing to do here. And sentences:

86. ‘John said ‘I saw Anna and a man’’ and
87. ‘John sagte ‘I saw Anna and a man’’

equally quote the same sentence and the language of the quoting sentence does not matter. Thus there are not English, German or French isolated quotations of the given sentence. Isolated quotations are not in English or in German. They are passages in speech that are beyond any language. Moreover the situation does not change even in the case of translative quotes like:

88. ‘John said in German ‘I saw Anna and a man’’.

The translation to English plays only the auxiliary role for the recipient but changes nothing in the situation of the quotation. Notice that the following sentence is equally proper:

89. ‘John said in English ‘Ich sah Anna und einen Man’,

though here the translation is rather less helpful.

On the other hand a quote informs the listener of an utterance but it is important to distinguish the sign and the thing it refers to. If the utterance was a piece of language speech with a given established meaning and syntactic structure then it
is worth to underline that the meaning and the structure do not belong to the quote. They are merely suggested by it, because a quote is not an utterance but merely an act of pretending it, a sham utterance. Quotation informs the listener of syntax and meaning without having it itself. The situation is exactly the same as with expressions referring to dogs. The expressions themselves do not possess heads, legs, and tails themselves. Take also a case of a photograph which informs of facial lines of a man without being a face and having lines.

The situation is not different in the case of assimilated quotations because still the syntax of the original utterance is merely suggested by them and this what is going on during the process of assimilation is the trespassing of the syntax (and vocabulary) of the quoting sentence on the matter of quotation (see par. 48-53).

It seems that it is not possible to confuse dogs and the word ‘dog’, a word and the object it refers to, but in the case of words it is less strange because quotes may look identical to the words they refer to. In the sentence:

90. ‘John said ‘Mary loves Peter’’

the phrase ‘Mary loves Peter’ is not a sentence but merely it means a sentence, the phrase ‘Mary’ is not a name but merely it means a name etc. Nevertheless we can make a mistake easily and take these signs for signs that refer to because they look the same.

34. Accessibility of Quoted Utterance
All this does not mean that that the content of the quoted utterance is inaccessible to the recipient. It may be if the quote literally displays the shape of an utterance spoken in a language unknown to the listener. But if he knows the quoted language the presented shape gives him the picture of the utterance which is entirely sufficient to understand it. Usually this is the actual aim of the quotator, as if he was saying, ‘You have not heard these words by your own but I can picture them for you, thus in this way you can imagine and understand them. My picturing is not these words but my aim is to make the picture as adequate and detailed as it is necessary for you to have an imagination that we need in our conversation.’. This is a case of indirect understanding (see par. 6).

Therefore if the language of the quotation is understandable for the listener the content of the quote is accessible for him. It is presented though not directly. Thus there is nothing strange that you can refer to it in the conversation as in Partee’s cases (1973):

91. ‘‘I talk better English than the both of youse!’ shouted Charles, thereby convincing me that he didn’t’ (p. 416),
92. ‘The sign says, ‘George Washington slept here,’’ but I don't believe he really did’ (p. 417).

The situation is exactly the same as in all other cases when you refer to a particular in a nonlinguistic way. When you succeeded and your recipient has understood which particular you meant then there is nothing strange that you can refer to some properties of it (actually the content is one of the properties of the sign you refer to by your quote). Say Mary asks you, ‘How did you go there?’, and you take the car keys from your pocket and ring with them. You refer to your car this way, and then there is nothing strange that you can say something like ‘I like that it is so fast’.

35. Quotation and Theory of Truth
Generally you cannot make a Tarski-Davidsonian-style truth theory for a language with quotation because there is an infinite number of possible quotations and they do not obey any rules. Nevertheless it may seem tempting to consider some narrower problems. Say that you have a truth theory for a language L and you want add to it the possibility of quoting utterances in the same language L. The aim is to close the infinite set of T-sentences like:

93. ‘The sentence ‘John wrote ‘snow is white’’ is true iff John wrote ‘snow is white’’

in an axiomatic system with a finite set of primitive T-sentences and rules of obtaining one of them from another. Would it be possible?

The answer is no, and the reason of this is that quotations have no internal structure that is described in the terms of the quoting language (the language L in this case). It seems that we see the structure, that for example we see that quotes are made of letters or from words, as in the above sentence. Nevertheless from the point of view of the quoting sentence the structure is merely physical but not syntactical. They are only letter-like or word-like shapes on paper placed one after another. Merely they suggest the syntactical structure of the quoted utterance.

It seems that the only way is the Tarskian one. Only when you have structural-descriptive names of utterances you can use them to make a system which enables making a theory of truth for utterances, though it seems that (different than Tarski) it is possible that the elementary items of such names need not to be names of elementary parts of utterances but they may be quotes of them too. Shortly speaking it could be possible to concatenate quotes starting from elementary ones, as quotes of letters (‘a’, ‘b’, ‘c’ etc.). Thus the axioms of such theory could look like:
94. ‘The sentence ‘John wrote ‘a’’ is true iff John wrote ‘a’’

And there should be a rule that would allow to come from something like:

95. ‘The sentence ‘John wrote ‘a’ before ‘b’’ is true iff John wrote ‘a’ before ‘b’’

to

96. ‘The sentence ‘John wrote ‘a’\^‘b’’ is true iff John wrote ‘a’\^‘b’’.

On the other hand if one expects that it would be possible to introduce the semantics of the quoted utterances into the semantics of the quoting sentences in one theory of truth he misses the point because the content of the quoted utterance is not a compositional part of the quoting sentence in the affirmative sense. The quoting sentence merely informs that a given utterance had place without adjudicating was it true or not. Thus the content of quoted utterances may not be a part of the truth theory for quoting sentences.

36. A General Remark on Theory of Truth

Let me put in this point a general remark on the idea of semantic compositionality. In general I do not accept this approach because I think that a sign is only a tool to create a given content in the recipient’s mind and there is no necessary structural similarity between them, though it may happen when the temporal sequence of sounds is similar to a temporal or spatial string of particulars they refer to. Compare the structural similarity between a paintbrush and paints on the one hand and the painting on the other—generally there is none (see Author’s article 2). Actually in general there is no logical form neither in the mental content nor in sentences.

Nevertheless similarly as in the case of painting the process of communication may be automated. You can imprint on the canvas ready-made shapes in a given order as you can send a precisely prepared sequences of partial signs that have strictly established senses (contributions to the final mental content). And this goes on in artificially formalized languages, and the logical form exists only in them. The less a language is formalized, the less its sentences represent (or possess) any logical form. Therefore Tarski (1933, p. 164) was right that only in reference to formalized languages it is possible to formulate a theory of truth, for the idea of compositionality is in force only toward them.

On the other hand it is overall possible to formulate a general theory of communication. A part of it would be a theory that would state something like
what kind of sign in what kind of circumstances sent by what kind of sender to what kind of recipient produced what kind of content in the recipient’s mind. Thus the relation between the sign and the content (with all other factors constant) would be somehow taken into account in it. Nevertheless such a theory for many reasons would not be of the logical kind. One reason is that logic requires that the whole sentence is made of symbols, whereas there are also other kinds of partial signs. Another reason is that logic requires automatism of understanding the content of the sentence, whereas there is also communication based on guessing. Only the theory of communication with formalized languages may be logical or compositional.

Therefore it is not my intention here to formulate a theory of logic of communication or a theory of compositionality of signs. My aim here is to analyze what means (signs) are used in cases of effective communication, and this goes on only when a content is intentionally produced in the recipient’s mind, and this requires that the process does not go by chance but by the communicational abilities of the sender and the recipient.

37. Practical Baptizing
Hence what happens during a practical baptism, i.e. in cases when you guess the meaning of a used word, and thus you understand what was told, so the meaning of the word is established? If this happens it means that the additional information you have about the communicational situation is sufficient for the correct understanding and guess. The use of the word was redundant. Therefore you understand the transmitted content independently from the word, and on the basis of this understanding you reconstruct the meaning of the used unknown word. Thus the principle ‘no naming if your recipient has not known the name before’ is still at force, because this is not a case of naming—it is not a case when the content is transmitted with a word not known previously. The content is transmitted by the extra information and the word is merely learnt. In the case of the apple the extra information has been delivered by your perception of what John took from the table.

38. Figural and Semantic Quotation
There are two aspects of a communicational process which are usually reproduced in quotation, I call them ‘areas of quotation’:

I. The sign (see par. 3) and
II. The content produced in the recipient’s mind (the actual or dispositional meaning of the sign, see par. 4).

As the result we obtain two general kinds of quotes, respectively:
I. Figural quotes and
II. Semantic quotes.

In semantic quotes your visible activity may be entirely different than the original, as painting and making a photo are two entirely different ways of obtaining similar pictures. There are a few basic cases of semantic quotes: a. that-clauses (see par. 48-53), b. translative quotes (see par. 38) and c. ideograms. When one utters the word ‘seven’ and you quote it in writing with the figure ‘7’ (an ideogram), then you quote him semantically, because what you perform in fact is a sign with the same meaning, but it carries merely the meaning and no other information of the given communicational behavior (that is why it is an ideogram). The same is when you quote ‘two plus two equals four’ with written ‘2 + 2 = 4’. (Notice that the concept of an ideogram is relative (in reference to speech usually), because when one used the sign ‘7’ and you quote it with the shape ‘7’ then you make a figural quote, moreover the signs may mean something different than ‘seven’ then.) Further when you quote ‘the dog is ill’ with German ‘der Hund ist krank’, again the quotation is entirely different than the original, only the logical meaning is the same. Also you can quote ‘snow is white’ with a paraphrase like ‘a big number of small crystals of water oriented in space accidentally scatters the light in all directions equally’, again it would be different but the meaning would be similar. (For translative quotations see also Clark and Gerrig 1990, p. 774, 777ff., Ginzburg and Cooper 2014, p. 291).

39. Fidelity of Effigy

As I have mentioned (in par. 14) an effigy may be significantly different from the original. The range of acceptable difference establishes in fact a kind of particulars, both the effigy and the original are to belong to it. The only problem is if your recipient understands well what kind you refer to with what sample. There is an infinite number of this how you may take the kind and therefore there is an infinite number of the ways you can demonstrate a sample in order to refer to a given utterance. (By the way let me state in this point clearly that I am not committed to the so called verbatim assumption, see Clark and Gerrig 1990, p. 795.)

Logically there is a large spectrum between extreme cases, samples as similar as possible on one hand and very wide kinds whose samples possess almost no informative value on the other. The possibility of such uninformative samples is the reason that from the general point of view almost everything may be taken as a sample similar to something in a wide sense. A car may seem to be similar to a fridge because it belongs with it to one kind of objects not larger than 10 m. Therefore because of the infinity of modes of quotation there is no sense to consider whether something is an effigy of something in general but only it makes sense to ask if something is an effigy of an object in a given sense of
similarity. Hence there is no sense to ask if a sound is a quote of a given utterance in general but only if it is a quote of it in the given detailed meaning. The only limit for the lack of informative values of a quote is that it still has to be a shape that could be used as a given sign, thus it is to be sharp enough to be understood.

If you take a kind of things then some features are necessary for objects belonging to this kind, some are free and some may be limited by ranges of variability. For example such a kind like little iron objects may be defined as all the objects which (1) are made of iron, (2) have no points more distant than 10 cm, and (3) have free shape. When you present an effigy of an object belonging to a kind then the more narrow is the kind the more the effigy must resemble the original and (on the other hand) the more wide the kind is the more different the copy may be from the original. We can grasp this aspect of depiction speaking of the fidelity of an effigy.

Actually what counts is not how close to the original the effigy is, but how narrow is the suggested kind of objects. It is so because the listener assesses the fidelity of the effigy just on the basis of the wideness of the kind. If the kind is wide then he assumes that any presented reproduction resembles the original widely, and he does not guess that an effigy is very close to the original if by chance it is the case. It may happen for example that one describes in a paper a printed word ‘dog’. Usually when we do this we assume that the presented kind covers all the cases with the same sequence of letters, and this would be what the reader would understand, i.e. that the described inscription consists of three letters of the Roman alphabet no matter of what font, size, color etc. But it could happen in the given case that the font, size, color and even the kind of paper were exactly the same in the effigy that the reader perceives in his copy of the paper as in the original the author describes. Nevertheless this accidental coincidence could not be guessed by the reader because he interprets the fidelity of quotation upon the range of variability that is suggested. At most the reader could think that the original could—but only could—look exactly as the copy he can see with his own eyes, because it would not be excluded by the suggested idea of the kind.

How can the listener know what kind you mean when you present a given sample of it? For sure a given token may be interpreted in an infinite number of ways, so Bennett (1988, p. 403) is right that the token itself is not enough, and that you cannot know which features of it are relevant. The quotation listener has to guess it, and you can help him, and the existing customs may help him. But this is not a special problem of quotation. Guessing the general upon a finite number of samples (often it is a one) is a natural part of any communication in general and of any thinking as well.
40. Structural Quotes

It may happen that two signs have the same structure (they are isomorphic). It requires that in both of them you can distinguish such a list of elements that:

I. All items of one list have their counterparts on the other, and that
II. All relations between elements of one list that are important for the meaning of the given sign have their counterparts in relations between the relevant items of the other.

It also means that there is a function (an isomorphism) which transforms one sign onto the other and vice versa and preserves the significant structure of them. We say that such two signs are structurally similar, and elements of such structures are code signs (see par. 12 point IV). That is what connects writings and spoken utterances.

What is important, the fact that writing was created upon the pattern of speech does not mean that letters are names of phonemes, but they substitute them. Actually we should not say that the letter ‘d’ denotes the phoneme ‘d’ but that it substitutes it. For both systems have the same symbolic power they may be used interchangeably. John may sit near Mary and say to her ‘I’, write down in such a manner that she could see ‘love’, and return to speech with saying ‘you’.

Some systems of writing let to substitute sounds of speech almost a letter (or a sequence of letters) for a phoneme (German is a good example), and some are quite far from this ideal (as English) and to a degree you can rather speak of substitution of sequences of letters for whole spoken words. There is possible an infinite number of systems of code signs structurally interchangeable with speech (hence with writing as well). Of course usually such systems omit some more or less significant aspects of speech like the original timbre, intonation and loudness. On the other hand the only limit when you use such a code is that your listener understands well that you use it. Thus in the sentence:

97. ‘John said ‘Hotel echo lima lima oscar’”

there is a quote of the word ‘hello’ if your recipient understands that you use NATO phonetic alphabet just to refer to one word. (The difference between code signs and usable shapes is that the former actually are used to code signs in a given kind of communicational systems, whereas the latter merely may be used as code signs in a kind of communication.) An equivalence class of structurally similar signs produced in various code systems is a codable sign (see par. 12 point VII).
A function which encodes parts of an utterance may be composited with an order (permutation) function. Thus ‘gdo’ could be a quote for ‘dog’ if the recipient knew that he is to decode the quote in the letter sequence 231.

A detailed kind of structural quotation are Quine’s corner quotes (1940) ‘^…^’. In this case the coding function is composited with a function telling what sequence of signs is denoted by a sentence formula.

**41. Substitute and Name**

It is important to distinguish substitutes of signs and their names. Take the following situation. It is acceptable that some long sequences of signs are coded with some other long sequences. It may be that the word ‘I’ is coded with ‘marra’, ‘love’ with ‘darra’, and ‘you’ with ‘varra’, then the phrase ‘I love you’ could be substituted with ‘marra darra varra’. (Such kind of coding takes place in so called loan translations) On the other hand it may be that the same words have (general) names, say respectively: ‘kong’, ‘vong’ and ‘wong’. Then in the sentence:

98. ‘John said ‘marra darra varra’’

there is a quote. But in:

99. ‘John said kong, vong, wong.’

there is not. There is merely a list of names (that is why I have not used quotation marks in it). Generally it is not easy to distinguish substitutions from names in a unknown language. One simple criterion is the order. A list of names is a conjunction thus a change in order of the elements does not change the logical content and value of the sentence—still it is true that a given list of words was said though may be in a different order (for conjunction is symmetric). Of course conjunction suggests the temporal order of things but this order is a physical property of the utterance but not a part of its content. Instead a permutation of parts within the quote ‘marra darra varra’ could change a true sentence into a false one. In the sentence:

100. ‘John said kong, vong, wong in the given order.’

the situation does not change (cf. Davidson 1979, p. 81). ‘Kong’, ‘vong’, ‘wong’ are still the names of words connected with a conjunction. Nevertheless in this case the order is important. It is so because the phrase ‘in the given order’ points to the beginning of the utterance. It refers to a physical property of it (the given
order of elements) with the concept of order (cf. par. 14). In fact the sentence contains two statements so its logical content is the same as of:

101. ‘John said kong, vong, wong and the words kong, vong, wong were spoken in the given order.’

Here the content of the first member is still the same and it means that John uttered the three words in no matter what order and again the phrase ‘in the given order’ refers to the order suggested by the spatial arrangement of physical parts of the utterance located just before it. Thus again in this sentence as a whole the order of words is important. But it is not important literally, i.e. it is not important from grammatical point of view for obtaining the given meaning of the sentence. It is important as an accidentally chosen case of the order of words it speaks of in the second member. Notice that the adverbial ‘in the given order’ is not necessary in the case of actual quote ‘marra darra varra’ or ‘I love you’, and this would look rather strange if added. Of course you can put the order directly saying:

102. ‘John said kong, vong, wong and the kong was spoken as the first one, the vong as the second, and the wong as the third.’

Enumeration of elements and giving the order makes the logical content of the functor of concatenation. So it comes out that the above sentence means the same as:

103. ‘John said kong$vong\wong.’

And this means that a quotation of an utterance is not a concatenation of general names of parts of the utterance. For (96) looks entirely different.

Less fictional cases of naming in presentation of an utterance are:

105. ‘John wrote aitch, ee, ell, ell, oh’.

Let me underline that they are not quotes. They are sequences of names referring to parts of the original utterance. The difference between names and quotes of letters was well understood by Tarski (cf. 1933, p. 156).

In (98) the order of partial shapes in ‘marra darra varra’ also is not of grammatical kind because a quote does not belong to any language and hence to any grammar. It is only a sham language phrase. Nevertheless the order is important as one of the physical properties of the shape. This is so firstly
because when you sample all the physical properties of the sample may be important thus the order of elements is included. Secondly since quoting is usually sampling language shapes so we customarily take the order of elements as an important property here, because usually the order of words is important in language communication. In a concatenation the order is communicated via the established meaning of symbols whereas in a quote it is simply presented to the senses of the recipient.

42. Sequence of Quotes
For the same reasons:

106. ‘John said ‘I’, ‘love’, ‘you’’,
107. ‘John said ‘I’, ‘love’, ‘you’ in the given order’,
108. ‘John said ‘I’, ‘love’, ‘you’ and ‘I’ was spoken as the first one, ‘love’ as the second and ‘you’ as the third’,
109. ‘John said ‘I’‘love’‘you’’

... do not mean the same as:

110. ‘John said ‘I love you’’

and:

113. ‘John wrote ‘h’, ‘e’, ‘l’, ‘l’, ‘o’ and ‘h’ was written as the first one, ‘e’ as the second, ‘l’ as the third, ‘l’ as the fourth and ‘o’ as the fifth’,
114. ‘John wrote ‘h’‘e’‘l’‘l’‘o’’

... do not mean the same as

115. ‘John wrote ‘hello’’.

And this means that a concatenation of partial quotes is not the same as a full quote. Let me emphasize again the reason of this. The order of elements belongs to the logical content of a concatenation whereas in a full quote the order is given not as a logical content but as a temporal (or spatial) relation between parts of a physical event, which is the sample. That is why I think that Geach’s descriptive explanation of quotation is wrong (1957, pp. 82f.). ‘...a quoted series of expressions is...’ not ‘...a series of quoted expressions...’ (I use his words against him with addition of ‘not’, cf. p. 82), and ‘...the quotation ‘man is mortal’ is...’ not ‘...rightly understood only if we read it as meaning the same as ‘“man”“is”“mortal”’, i.e., read it as describing the quoted expression in terms...
of the expressions it contains and their order’ (see pp. 82–83). An argument against Geach’s view are unknown language quotes. They are entirely understandable as quotes even when the listener does not know what is the word division in them. This means that word division (or any other language particle division) does not belong to the content of the quoting sentence.

Usually Tarski (1933, p. 160) and Quine (1960, pp. 143, 212) are found to hold descriptive theory of quotation (Davidson suggests this, 1979, p. 86, 1968, p. 97, and Cappelen and Lepore 2012, 3, 2). In fact Tarski does not claim that quotes are concatenations or vice versa. Merely he says that concatenations (literally ‘structural-descriptive names’) are ‘Another category of names of sentences for which we can construct analogous explanations’ (p. 156, he means logical names I guess). Moreover he writes that

‘quotation-mark names … can be eliminated and replaced everywhere by, for example, corresponding structural-descriptive names’ (p. 160).

Thus it seems that he finds them as something entirely different.

Also Tarski is found to analyze ‘bachelor’ as ‘b’^‘a’^‘c’^‘h’^‘e’^‘l’^‘o’^‘r’ (Cappelen and Lepore 2012, 3, 2). In fact it does not seem so, because he never speaks of structural-descriptive names or the symbol of concatenation used toward quotations but always toward names of expressions. There are no examples of this kind in the referred Tarski’s work (1933), because he does not use the symbol of concatenation in the part dedicated to natural language (the first time the symbol ‘…^…’ appears at page 172). But when he writes about structural-descriptive names of words he uses symbolic names of letters (‘A’, ‘Be’, ‘Ce’ etc.)—not quotes of letters—he explicitly underlines this: ‘but not quotation-mark names’ (p. 157). Davidson somehow does not see that (1979, p. 87) but a transition from quotes of letters like ‘a’ to names of letters like ‘A’ (Tarski) or ‘ay’ (Davidson) is of the crucial character.

A necessary remark here is this. According to my theory of communication there are lots of ways you can refer to an utterance. Nevertheless most of them are not quotes. On the other hand all the ways are equivalent in this meaning that they may refer to one and the same utterance. So you can replace one with another salva veritate or even eliminate one with some others. However the referential equivalence and interchangeability does not mean that the ways are identical. They still may be different. I think that Tarski claims simply that quotation-mark names and structural-descriptive names are two different ways of referring to expressions and he never suggests that the former are in fact the same as the latter.
In this place there is also a possibility to commit a categorical mistake. The danger is to confuse a name and the object it refers to. To avoid this you have to distinguish concatenations and mereological sets, i.e. mereological wholes made of parts. A chair is a mereological whole made of legs, a seat and a back but it is not a concatenation. In the same way the word ‘dog’ is not a concatenation of letters ‘d’, ‘o’ and ‘g’. The term concatenation refers to a kind of expressions which we use to talk about compound wholes but not to the wholes. Simply you can refer to the word dog with the concatenation ‘d’^‘o’^‘g’ but this is only one of many way of referring to it. A sample of the graphic shape ‘dog’ is also a whole made of partial letters ‘d’, ‘o’ and ‘g’ but it is not a concatenation of them upon this fact (see also my previous remark on Richard, par. 23).

43. Usual Ranges of Variability in Quotation
You can distinguish the following exemplary ranges of variability (or fidelity) of samples in quotations (cf. a similar enumeration in Clark and Gerrig 1990, p. 769):

I. In speech: timbre of voice, pronunciation, intonation, loudness, melodics, rhythm, audible emotions;
   II. In writing: material you write on, character of lettering, size, color, kind of pen, orthography;
   III. Additionally in print: font, kind of the printer’s ink;
   IV. In semantic quotes: language, the starting point of indexicals (see par. 48), vocabulary, used individual names (see par. 49), the presentation order (see par. 50), the order of words, objectivity (see par. 51).

44. Substitution under Quotation
As we see there is in fact an infinite number of possible quotation modes. Only a small part of this number is being used in practice in a single language. The difference between the possible and the actually being used is principally important when you analyze any phenomenon and quotation especially. The actual is accidental and says little about the concept and a kind of things in general. The proper object for consideration is what is generally possible. If there is a thing that usually we do not do it does not mean that this thing is not possible or generally inaccurate.

For example some researchers maintain that you cannot replace a part of a quote with a synonym (cf. Cappelen and Lepore 2012, BQ1, Davidson 1979, p. 88). I claim that this restriction does not refer to quotation in general but to quoting in the same language as we usually do. And who is the ‘we’? Western culture? Indo-European languages? Some comparative study over quotation in various cultures and languages is required. I must confess I have infinitesimal knowledge of this.
We do not substitute in isolated quotes unless they are of the translatative kind. Usually you cannot substitute ‘bachelor’ with ‘unmarried man’ in:

116. ‘John said ‘I am a bachelor’’.

But you could if your listener knew that John was speaking German and you give a translation of his utterance. Then you may have some freedom in the word choice according to the chosen translation mode, like philological, literary or poetic.

Thus usually when your listener hears the sentence he thinks that the quote is a reproduction of the sequence of phonemes that was really said by John, or structural reproduction of it with code signs when he reads it written (cf. par. 40). This is when he thinks that John was speaking English, and this is the prima facie mode of understanding. And you should not manipulate within such a quote because it would simply mislead your listener. If you replaced ‘bachelor’ with ‘unmarried man’ he would think that the latter phrase was actually spoken.

But this is not the only possible way to interpret the sentence. The context of conversation and all the additional information (like that John spoke German) may make the listener think that the isolatedly spoken quote is not an effigy of the sounds which were actually spoken but a semantic transformation of them. And this would be a secunda facie interpretation coming out from the context. This is similar to a situation when you use a word in a rare or special sense. Then your listener interprets the word in the usual or frequent sense unless you give him some additional hints or the context leads him properly. For example you can say:

117. ‘John knew Mary in London’

Then the recipient would think that they just met in London unless you add that it was in the biblical sense, or the context suggests this since your conversation with him is about Torah, Adam and Eve etc. The context and additional tips lead the listener to the accurate meaning of your utterance.

Therefore I claim that the restriction that you cannot substitute under an isolated quotation refers merely to the primary (prima facie, usual or most frequent) meaning of such a quote in our languages. But any additional hint to the listener may overrule it and draw his attention to the meaning of quote (mode of quotation) you actually use. You can say for example that you do not remember the exact John’s words, and still you may quote in the isolated manner without breaking any language rules.
Thus finally I claim that simply you have to obey the rules of the mode of quotation you actually use. If you quote isolatedly in the primary manner it means that the shapes you use are basically the same as the original. Thus you may not substitute them, because if you have chosen a mode you cannot break the rules. Simply if you have chosen to quote in the given quotation mode $M$ you have to obey the rules of the quotation mode $M$. If you break them this will not be still the quotation mode $M$, and if your listener interprets you as speaking in the quotation mode $M$ then he misunderstands you. Of course you can choose another mode, say translatative or another isolated one and allowing paraphrases, and then you can substitute parts of the quotation (within the range of what is allowed in the new given mode), but you have to inform your listener somehow what mode of quotation you use.

It is not strange that during a logical consideration you think about the primary meaning only because such a consideration is very abstract (abstract in the sense that there are no additional hints available). You take a citation of a word and usually you even do not think what it would mean if anybody would say it to you but simply ask what the word means in general. Actually you perform such considerations entirely outside of a situation of communication. And remember the rule: the primary meaning you take when there is no additional tips, the secondary one and any other you can take only when there are some hints. Nevertheless in such a pure consideration there are no hints. Thus you cannot avoid this that you have merely the primary meaning in mind, and it is hard for you to imagine any other possible meaning of it. And you can think that you analyze the meaning of the word in general whereas this is in fact only one of a large variety of modes merely. To avoid this mistake, instead you have to imagine that one utters this phrase in a given situation to a man and you have to put the question what it would mean to him then. You have to analyze actual use cases.

Let me add for clarity that the primary rule that you cannot substitute under isolated quotation refers to figural quotation (see par. 38), whereas when substitution is allowed it cannot be still a figural quote but it can be merely a semantic one. On the other hand that-clauses are prima facie semantic quotes and you can substitute within them without any additional guide that you do this. Nevertheless the question to what degree the original words are changed is still open-ended, and this gives rise of the variety of quotation modes for that-clauses (see also par. 48-53).

45. Quantification into Quotation
Similarly it is said that you cannot quantify into isolated quotes (cf. Cappelen and Lepore 2012, BQ2, Davidson 1979, p. 88), and similarly I claim that this is
not a question of basic logical property of quotation but a matter of consistency of an act of communication. Again I say that if you have chosen the mode of quotation where quantification is not allowed you cannot quantify into your quote, but if you have chosen one that allows this then you can. And again I say that primarily you cannot quantify into a quotation but secondarily you can, though the difference between the primary and secondary (secunda facie) use is not so important here because the listener does not need any additional hints when he hears:

118. ‘There is a verb $x$ such that John said ‘I $x$ Mary’’

It is so because the quantification phrase ‘There is a verb $x$ such that’ goes around to guide the listener that this is not a usual quote but a quote manipulated with quantification. It is almost impossible that a listener would understand the sentence in such manner that he would think that John spoke the phrase ‘I $x$ Mary’ actually, with ‘$x$’ pronounced as ‘ex’. (Let me also add that even if such a sentence looks strange or reckless form the point of view of strong standards of truth theory or model-theoretic semantics it makes no problem here. The only what counts in communication—I repeat this ad nauseam—is that the recipient understands the sign, and you cannot say that it is not the case here. Nevertheless for a believer in compositionality—though they can never be satisfied—let me add that the quantification in such a sentence goes through the set of citations of imaginable English verbs that fit to the SVO schema, and that ‘$x$’ is the place where one of these citations should be placed.)

In this example we have quantification over the form of utterance (which word was used), but it is also possible quantification over meaning, i.e. over things you talk about, e.g.:

119. ‘There is a person $x$ such that John said ‘I love $x$’’.

Let me state for clarity that you can use quantification over the form in figural and semantic quotes whereas you can quantify over the meaning in semantic quotation only.

46. Existential Quantification into Quotation

Quantification into a quote has two aspects: fidelity and concision. As far as to the former in the above cases one does not know what John said in fact. The range of possibilities corresponds to the range of the variable. When you say:

120. ‘There is a verb $x$ of the set $V$ such that John said ‘I $x$ Mary’’
and your listener knows that the set is \{'love', 'hate'\}, then he knows that it was
'I love Mary' or 'I hate Mary' but does not know which one. This
undetermination gives the range of fidelity of quotation in this case, so this is the
fidelity aspect. Remember that the question of fidelity is based on the range of
admissible variability and notice that the set \(V\) establishes the range of
variability, it is figural variability here.

**47. Universal Quantification into Quotation**

On the other hand if you say:

121. ‘For all the verbs \(x\) of the set \(V\) John said ‘I \(x\) Mary’’

this is an abbreviation which you can use instead of saying:

122. John said ‘I love Mary’ and ‘I hate Mary’,

which would be a real abbreviation if the set were larger. In such a case the
quote is not an exact sample of the original utterance sound. Simply you say one
sentence instead of two. You can say that this is something like a concentrated
or universal effigy. And this is the concision aspect.

**48. That-clauses as Indexical Switch Mode**

Say that Tom said:

123. ‘I see Anna and a man’.

Jake could say:

124. ‘Tom said that he saw Anna and a man.’

This is a semantic quote in which the paraphrase relies on the switch of
indexicals to the perspective of the speaker. And this is the essence of that-
clauses. (Understandability of such sentences requires that everybody knows
that you can quote with that-clauses by indexical switch.)

There is a traditional view according to which a that-clause is not a quote (e.g.
Clark and Gerrig 1990, p. 764, Saka 2013, p. 935). Instead they say that a that-
clause is a phrase which refers to the proposition it expresses. According to this
view in an utterance you use a sentence and when you quote you quote the used
sentence. Propositions are something different. A proposition is the logical
content of the utterance. You say that an utterance expresses the given
proposition, and that there is a categorical difference between propositions and
utterances. That-clauses refer to propositions (they give the content of the utterance), therefore they are not quotes.

Briefly speaking I do not accept this view but I find the general intuition correct. The intuition strives to say that there is an important difference between speaking and writing on the one hand and the mental content on the other, i.e. figural quotes whose objects are visible and semantic quotes which object (the content in the recipient’s mind) is invisible (hidden within the recipient’s head). Moreover the former kind of quoting allows rather narrow range of acceptable fidelity, whereas when you quote the content then the quotation may be materially entirely different. It is so because you can obtain the same content with a very voluminous bag of tricks—various figural signs—various utterances spoken or written. That is why you feel that propositions are something wider than sentences and that the latter merely serve to express them. (For shortness I consider here merely utterances which possess logical value so they express propositions, and I omit utterances which express other propositional attitudes like questions, orders or wishes.) Actually a proposition is an utterance with a given content.

There is also a terminological problem. We could simply not call semantic quotes ‘quotes’. It would follow a vocabulary intuition (that I share) which says that in communication you have means and their effects, and that basically when you quote you reproduce the means but not the effects, thus you should call ‘quotes’ merely figural ones, but not the semantic. But on the other hand this would require to resign from calling ‘quotes’ the translative quotations. But if we want to talk for example about the words which God spoke to Moses ‘I am that I am’ (Exodus 3:14) that this is a quote, then we simply accept semantic quotation; and in fact there is no reason then to exclude any other kind of paraphrase quotes, i.e. quotations which give the same meaning but with other words. This simply means that our intuition is wrong and after some deliberation I decided that simplicity requires to call that-clauses ‘quotes’ too, and this is what my theory claims here. Davidson’s brilliant remarks (1968, p. 105f.) opened my eyes.

Therefore I claim here that that-clauses are a kind of paraphrase quotes. Strictly the connective ‘that’ simply indicates the indexical perspective switch to the point of view of the attributor, and nothing more.

Clark and Gerrig claim that that-clauses are descriptions of original utterances (1990, p. 764). Such claims seems to me obviously false because a description of an utterance would have to use names: a holistic name of the whole or a series of partial names and a name of the relation between the parts (as in a structural-
descriptive name), whereas words which go on in a that-clause are not names of parts of the utterance nor of relations between them.

49. Individual Name Not Preserving Mode
Jake, believing that Anna is Mark’s sister, could say:

125. ‘Tom said that he saw Mark’s sister and a man’.

The paraphrase would include not only the indexical switch but also the replacement of some original individual names with some other having the same referents.

This is a way of quoting where the original individual names used by the subject to refer to some given objects may be changed by the attributor according to his purposes. If it was important for Jake to mention that Tom saw Mark’s sister he could put this description into Tom’s mouth in his report. It is entirely proper if the listener understands that the new description may come from Jake, not from Tom. Notice that it is even not necessary that Jake’s listener knows that the name ‘Anna’ was replaced by the phrase ‘Mark’s sister’. For correct communication it is enough that he guesses that in the given quote such a change could take place. Usually you use this kind of quoting when you know that your listener does not know the original names and the case is not important enough to explain in another sentence who is who, in ancient historical narration for example. Generally there is a large variety of more detailed quotation modes of this kind.

50. Presentation Order Not Preserving Mode
A detailed kind of individual names change refers to the phenomenon I call ‘the order of presentation’. Let us consider the situation when Tom saw two persons, a woman and a man. Tom called the woman ‘Anna’. Say we know that the man’s name was ‘Robert’. Thus Tom saw Anna and Robert. We can describe the situation in a few ways, which I say differ in the order of presentation:

126. ‘A man saw a woman and a man’,
127. ‘A man saw a woman and Robert’,
128. ‘A man saw Anna and a man’,
129. ‘A man saw Anna and Robert’,
130. ‘Tom saw a woman and a man’,
131. ‘Tom saw a woman and Robert’,
132. ‘Tom saw Anna and a man’,
133. ‘Tom saw Anna and Robert’.
All these descriptions refer to the same situation, the same configuration of objects and relations between them. Nevertheless the objects in some sentences are referred to with definite descriptions or proper names and with indefinite descriptions in others. Intuitively we feel that when an indefinite description is used then the object referred to is not important as an individual but as a member of a kind. When you say ‘a woman’ you want to say that it is not important which woman was there but merely you want to mention that there was one of women. Thus using indefinite or definite descriptions (and proper names as well) you inform your listener which objects are important in the described situation from your point of view.

The order of presentation in a report has nothing to do with that all the described objects are equally real. Even if you do not know the name, you can always turn an indefinite description into a definite one, though it is not usually a simply grammatical transformation, and it requires some information concerning the source of your beliefs referring to the given object. For example a man in the said situation is the man which Tom saw with Anna then. However our languages are built in such a way that a transformation of this kind may not be done always within one and the same utterance. In ‘Tom saw Anna and a man’ you cannot replace ‘a man’ with ‘the man which Tom saw with Anna then’, because it would make a tautology. Thus in fact you cannot avoid the presentation order structure existing in every our utterance (cf. the way in which functional names become partial ones, par. 7).

After this introduction let me say that Jake could also report Tom’s utterance in a mode where the presentation order is not preserved:

134. ‘Tom said that he saw a woman and Robert.’

**51. Verbal and Factual Question of Logical Content**
From the point of view of the logical content of an utterance that a semantic quote refers to it is important to distinguish two different questions: a verbal and a factual one. The former refers to this

I. With what words the utterance is reproduced in the effigy, whereas the latter refers to this

II. What was really said by the sender from the point of view of the quotator (what information in fact the quotator has obtained after knowing the utterance).

I will briefly explain the difference between these two problems. Say Gottlob saw Ludwig running into a building, and Ludwig was Edmund’s brother. Gottlob recorded on his Dictaphone:
135. ‘Ludwig ran into a house.’

Then say one quotes this utterance saying:

136. ‘Gottlob said that Edmund’s brother had run into a house.’

Would this be accurate? Usually we think that it could but only if Gottlob knew that Ludwig was Edmund’s brother, and if he did not then such a report of his utterance would not be adequate. Usually we feel that the proper criterion in such situations is the knowledge of quoted person.

Say further two policemen Rudolf and Otto follow Ludwig. Gottlob is their informer. Yesterday Rudolf had a conversation with him. Gottlob said that Ludwig had run into a given building. The policemen know that Ludwig is Edmund’s brother, but actually Gottlob has never heard about Edmund. Nevertheless Rudolf says to Otto:

137. ‘Gottlob said that Edmund’s brother had ran into a house.’

Is this utterance appropriate in this situation? The answer is ‘yes’, no matter that the quoted person (Gottlob) has no knowledge of Edmund. How this can be so?

In communication the only thing which counts is that the listener understands the speaker properly, hence a quote is appropriate if the quote listener understands exactly the aspect of the presented utterance the speaker wants to communicate. Rudolf’s saying is accurate because it is perfectly well understandable by Otto in the given conditions. These two policemen know exactly that Gottlob has no knowledge of Edmund. Therefore they know that if in any of their utterances about the case they put in Gottlob’s mouth the name Edmund then this is not what Gottlob literally thinks or says (because he does not know of this person) but merely it is their own (Rudolf and Otto’s) manner of speaking, which they take for simplicity in their conversations. A similar case would be if they used the underworld Ludwig’s nickname ‘Tractatus’, also unknown to Gottlob, and put it into his mouth when referring to his utterances during their conversations.

You could say that policemen simply do not care what Gottlob thinks because it is not relevant to the conversation. Yes, what they care is important for the mode of quotation they choose. Nevertheless whatever they choose their quotes refer to the original with the given degree of fidelity, and both the sender and the recipient know that.
On the other hand if there are no additional context hints of this kind our language custom prompts us to think (prima facie) that an utterance report refers to the described speaker’s knowledge and his way of formulating sentences, nevertheless the principle may be suspended in some special cases (say secunda facie, cf. par. 44). Moreover the example illustrates the general rule that when quoting an utterance you can use whatever words you want as long as your listener understands well which of your words are merely the dressing which you put on it for your own purposes in the conversation (like simplicity or shortness) and which words capture the actual way of speaking or thinking of the described speaker. So this is the verbal question. And this is what Church (1954) and Sellars (1955) deal with.

Say further that Gottlob reported to Rudolf that Ludwig talked to Immanuel (critical thinking teacher in the local high school). He said:

138. ‘Ludwig talked to Immanuel’.

However Rudolf thinks that it was impossible because, as he believes, Immanuel was in another town at this time and that this was for sure Moritz (a wheeler) whom Gottlob does not know but which is very similar to Immanuel. Rudolf has two options when describing the utterance to Otto. He can report what Gottlob literally said, from his (Gottlob the speaker’s) subjective point of view:

139. ‘Gottlob said that Ludwig had talked to Immanuel’

or he can put the actual person (from his Rudolf the attributor’s point of view) into Gottlob’s utterance:

140. Gottlob said that Ludwig had talked to Moritz.

Which option he chooses is a question of his choice, and the only condition is that Otto understands him well. In the first option it is important that Otto understands that Rudolf presents Gottlob’s subjective belief (that this was Immanuel). In the second option it is important that he understands that no matter what Gottlob subjectively said (to whom the man had talked) Rudolf believes that the actual person Ludwig talked to was Moritz (Immanuel need not to be mentioned). And this is the factual question. Both questions were presented upon the example of individual names but they refer to any kind of expressions, e.g. general names.

In sum the verbal question refers to what degree the quotator reproduces the speaker’s original way of word use and formulating thoughts. As we see some important problems may appear when the speaker does not know some relevant
words or facts which the quotator knows. Hence we have original and translatative (paraphrastic) word use (mode of quotation) in semantic quotations. On the other hand the factual question may appear only if there is a contradiction in beliefs between the speaker and the quotator. Then the quotator has to choose if he wants to present the speaker’s subjective point of view (i.e. the beliefs actually presented in the quoted utterance which the quotator believes to be false), or if he wants to say what the quoted utterance meant in fact from the point of view of his own beliefs. These two modes of quoting under the factual question I call ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ (cf. the author’s article).

Davidson (1968, p. 100) considers a case when somebody says ‘There is a hippopotamus in the refrigerator’ but all the rest he tells about the object fits to an orange. The question is what a that-clause speaker is to do: to say that the person said that there is a hippopotamus in the fridge or that he said that there is an orange. Nevertheless here I assume that the speaker has established an interpretation of the original words (the meaning of them). That is why Davidson’s case belongs to a different area. Only when the speaker decides what the person meant he could go on to the verbal or factual question of semantic quotation. When he decides that the person talked about an orange then he can go on to the verbal question and chose the original word ‘hippopotamus’ (verbal originality) or the less misleading ‘orange’ (verbal paraphrasticity). When he decides that the person talked about the animal then he can go on to the factual question and choose whether to report the actual utterance of a hippopotamus (factual subjectivity) or to say that the person actually talked about an orange (though he confused hippopotami with fruits because he was mentally ill for example; factual objectivity).

52. Mixed Modes as Rebuses
Of course there are mixtures. Parts of the quotation may belong to various modes. For example Jake could say:

141. ‘Tom said: ‘I saw Anna und ein Man’’.

This would be partially in the usual spoken quotation mode and partially translated to German. Or:

142. ‘Tom said that he saw Anna und ein Man’.

This would be the indexical switch mode with a part in the translatative to German mode. There is an infinite area of possible mixtures of this kind. The only limit is that the listener is able to understand well what is going on.

A mixed quote is also Davidson’s example (1979, p. 81):
143. ‘Quine said that quotation ‘has a certain anomalous feature’’.

This is partially an assimilated quotation (in the part ‘quotation’) and partially a foreign one (in the part ‘“has a certain anomalous feature”’). An interesting problem is that literally this is not a grammatically proper sentence. Because of the isolation the material quote is a foreign intruder in the body of the sentence, thus from the syntactic point of view the example is equivalent in fact to:

144. ‘Quine said that quotation @’.

where ‘@’ is something that is incompatible with the grammar of the quoting sentence (an English one). It is better visible when you put the materially quoted part of Quine’s utterance in a language unknown to the listener:

145. ‘Quine said that quotation ‘barra coudouna moomana’’.

We accept such sentences because as I claim here the communication is based on rebuses and intuitively we always stand for it, and pieces of language may be parts of such rebuses in any way. Switching from one language to another is a mild kind of such a rebus. But also recall the case with the sentence ‘I want to eat a fish’ (par. 2). It could be substituted with a rebus where only the beginning ‘I want to’ would be performed with words and the rest would be gestures.

Cappelen and Lepore claim that the sentence:

146. ‘Quine said that quotation Ted’

where ‘Ted’ is the name of the expression ‘has a certain anomalous feature’, is improper (they use the case as a counterargument against the proper name theory of quotation, Cappelen and Lepore 2012, 3. 1. 1. Objection 3). For sure they are right—grammatically. On the other hand such a sentence could be entirely acceptable as a communicational rebus made beyond any language if the listener really knew the sense of the name ‘Ted’.

Notice that I do not analyze mixed quotes as cases of scare quotes as some researchers do (Saka 2013, p. 937). They have to do this because usually they hold that that-clauses are not quotes in the strict sense and saying them you do descriptions (Calk and Gerrig 1990, p. 764). Then it is understandable that they interpret mixed quotations as scare ones. Now from my point of view that-clauses are still quotes in the strict sense but more or less paraphrastic. Nevertheless you can switch between modes of quotation during your quoting and that is a similar activity as switching between languages.
53. Final Remark on That-Clauses
For a reader it may seem strange that signs which are used in that-clauses are not words. Thus for clarity I insist and repeat that they are merely shapes of words and we use them to refer to words, and this is so even if we manipulate them and replace some shapes with some other. On the basis of these shapes the recipient imagines the original utterance and this imagination is the basis of his understanding it as if he witnessed it. Thus when you understand the sentence:

147. ‘Tom said that he saw Anna and a man.’

you do not understand the phrase ‘he saw Anna and a man’ directly but on the basis of it you create an imagination of the original Tom’s utterance and this imagined utterance is what you understand. This is the logical structure of that-clauses understanding. In mental practice you perform it so automatically, quickly and unconsciously that it may seem that you do understand the words directly.

54. Conclusion
The above paper, though it is much longer than I planned, gives a rudimentary conceptual insight into the phenomenon of communication that is sufficient to explain what quotation is and how simple cases of all main kinds of quotation are built. The general definitions of quotation and its variants are presented. It is pictured plainly in which points other theories of quotation are wrong or imprecise. Quotations are clearly distinguished from other similar significant activities as imitations. For the sake of brevity lots of questions are merely sketched—as for example the problem of propositions—hence the place for future research is very vast. The general feeling is that the proper analysis of communication needs to abandon the compositional paradigm, i.e. the research practice that assumes that the basic model of communication is the artificial formalized language of science, and also the linguistic paradigm, i.e. the analytical practice that assumes that the standard communication goes on by natural languages understood narrowly as practices of vocal or writing behaviors. Instead it is necessary to admit that suggesting, making rebuses and guessing are fundamental features of any communication and to broaden the scope of analysis to include also other than strictly vocal and writing behaviors. Let me also add that the present version of this paper would never come into being without the priceless help of my internet scientific friend Eleni Gregoromichelaki.

REFERENCES


